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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on C ontemporary Affairs by the Editor
Temptations and Conflicts
Only now is the number of people who have seen
The Last Temptation of Christ beginning to approach that
of those who have commented on it. The movie hasn't
reached our corner of Indiana yet, and so the observations that follow can be added to that vast company of
commentaries undistracted by personal knowledge.
Since even one who presumes to write in luce Tua cannot be expected to review a film he has not seen, those
observations will examine The Last Temptation not as a
work of art but as a cultural phenomenon.
No film in memory has created the furor this one
has, and it is the nature and significance of that uproar that calls for attention. One way of getting at that
is through comparison with a related event that occurred recently in our area .
Last spring the black community of Chicago became
incensed over a painting displayed in a gallery of the
school of the Art Institute of Chicago that portrayed
the late mayor. Harold Washington dressed in women's
underwear. When news of the painting leaked out,
outraged black members of the city council, accompanied by members of the city police force , descended
on the Art Institute and quite literally tore the painting from the walls (the painting was damaged in the
course of the operation). Reaction to the event quickly
polarized: the student artist, supported by the American Civil Liberties Union and other partisans of unfettered expression, pressed charges against those who
had taken action against the painting, while most
members of the black community, in the company of
a large number of sympathetic whites, expressed indignation over the insensitivity of the Art Institute
(which publicly apologized for its actions) in allowing
the painting to be displayed in the first place.
So the issue became defined : presumed first amendment rights vs. the offended sensibility of a significant
portion of the community. Legal questions aside (the
case is still under litigation) most people assessed the
matter in common-sense terms. The city council members, the majority of people decided , should not have
acted as vigilantes, and they behaved crudely when
they did . At the same time and more significantly,
most argued, the Art Institute displayed egregious
misjudgment in exhibiting a second-rate piece of art
that portrayed a revered and recently-deceased
member of the black community in demeaning and
humiliating fashion. The right of an individual to
create art, after all, does not imply a corresponding
September, 1988

duty of an exhibitor to display it. All people understood both the deep honor in which Chicago's black
community held Harold Washington and the great
pain and offense the painting aroused in that community, and-first-amendment absolutists to the contrary
notwithstanding-most people sensed intuitively the
balance of moral right in the matter. The law might
protect the painting, but moral decency would condemn those who let it see the light of day.

The law might protect the painting,
but moral decency would condemn those
who let it see the light of day.
If we were to operate by simple analogy, then, the
Last Temptation controversy would seem quickly to resolve itself. If it is an outrage to portray an honored
member of a socio-political community in degrad ing
fashion, surely it is unacceptable to do the same for
one understood by the Christian community to be the
incarnate son of God. Here gross insensitivity edges
into blasphemy, and whether or not the law recognizes
blasphemy as an actionable category, most people understand, even when they do not share, the emotional
pain it can inflict. Imagine, for example, how most of
us would react to a film that portrayed the prophet
Mohammed in terms as offensive as conservative
Christians see the depiction of Jesus in The Last Temptation. We might not want to see the film censored, but
we would fully understand and sympathize with those
in the Moslem community offended by it. We might
also join in condemnation of those responsible for the
making and distribution of the film.
But the question of The Last Temptation in fact is not
simple at all. It cannot, to begin with, automatically be
equated with the controversy over the painting of
Mayor Washington. It would require the most
latitudinarian definition to categorize the painting of
the late mayor, either in intent or effect, as a serious
statement of art. It was, in the first place, badly executed; more importantly, it had-despite the artist's
protests-no significant point to make. One cannot
know the mind of the artist, but it was difficult to read
his painting as anything other than the effort of a callow and insensitive young man to make a sensational
impact without regard either to artistic purpose or to
the effect of his work on those for whom Mayor
Washington was a figure to be held in reverence. We
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may have no reason to expect more of young art students, but neither are we required to take their attempts at career making with moral seriousness.
Such is not at all )the case with The Last Temptation
of Christ. By all reports, Martin Scorsese's film is a
seriously-intended rendering of Nikos Kazantzakis'
wrenching novel. This is neither sensationalism nor
triviality; it may not be intended as a statement of
faith, but no one is likely to deny its seriousness of
moral or artistic purpose. There are Christians who
have seen it who regard it as a powerful effort to consider with radical intent the central Christian doctrine
of the dual nature of Christ, that He was at once fully
human and fully divine. Most previous film attempts
at a portrayal of Jesus have so minimized his human
nature as to render it invisible. It is perhaps inevitable
in artistic terms that an effort to capture fully Jesus'
humanity should be incapable of capturing his divinity. Many of us have long since come to the conclusion
that Jesus of Nazareth, son of man and son of God ,
is beyond plausible presentation as a figure of dramatic imagination. He is to be worshiped, not artistically
interpreted. But even if attempts to capture Jesus
dramatically are inherently doomed to frustration (and
the point is surely arguable) , that does not mean that
those who attempt them in good faith should necessarily be condemned for impiety. At the same time-and
to add to the complexity of the matter-neither can
we assume that estimable art is always commensurate
with orthodox piety.
A number of matters come into consideration here,
beginning with that of theological integrity. It is significant in this context to record the response to The Last
Temptation of James Wall, editor of the liberal Christian
Century and a serious film critic. Wall is certainly no
fundamentalist, and he reports that he went to the
film wanting to like it, but he came away from it
deeply disappointed not only by what he saw as its artistic failure-he found it tedious and lifeless-but by
its being "utterly lacking in any serious theological vision."

The debate over the film's theological vision focuses
on the half-hour segment in which the dying Jesus
hallucinates over his "last temptation": being seduced
by Satan to renounce the cross and instead lead an ordinary life. Here and apparently elsewhere, the film
departs entirely from the New Testament record and
uses considerable literary license to imagine in full
and, for conservative Christians, offensive detail what
it might have meant for Jesus to be simply a man and
reject his messianic purpose.
Critics, religious and otherwise, disagree vigorously
on how well the film works within its own artistic and
theological terms, and only those who have seen it are
4
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qualified to make those judgments. But that's not all
there is to say about the question.
One gathers that the film's critics are divided for the
most part between those who see it as a serious artistic
effort and those who see it as an offensive, even blasphemous, affront to Christian faith. But perhaps that
sets up a spurious distinction: why might it not be
both? In previous efforts to capture the life of Christ,
we have often enough seen good (or at least pious)
theology make for bad art. Why should we not expect
to see good (or at least intriguing) art make for bad
theology? (A less interesting possibility is that
suggested by Wall : bad art and bad theology.)
Christians of a non-fundamentalist persuasion often
fall into a subtle trap in such matters. We don't want
to be identified with cultural or theological yahoos,
and so our instinct is carefully to distance ourselves
from any taint of fundamentalism when issues like response to The Last Temptation come into play. But
perhaps we should proceed with caution. If it is the
temptation of fundamentalists to be offended for trivial reasons, perhaps it is our temptation not to be offended--or not to be seen to be offended-when there
is every reason we should be.
No reverse snobbery is intended here. We know of
serious and committed Christians who have seen this
film and who found it a faith-enhancing, if troubling,
experience. But reconsider in imagination that painting of Harold Washington in women's underwear.
The young artist said he meant it to shock the black
community into rethinking its tendency to regard the
late mayor not as a flesh-and-blood human being but
as a semi-deity; he wanted, he said, not to insult
Harold Washington but to ensure that he be taken
seriously. Imagine that the young man was sincere in
that intention. Imagine as well that his painting had
been rendered with a skill commensurate with that intention. Sophisticated followers of the mayor might
come to understand and appreciate the point intended , but for the great majority of people who loved
Harold Washington the painting would remain a
grievous offense.
Then think of the conceded liberties-including imagined adultery-that The Last Temptation of Christ
takes with the life of Jesus. Ought we be surprised that
Christians of traditional and unsophisticated faith find
that film-whatever its artistic or theological intentions
and whether or not they intend to see it-an offense
in its very existence?
That's no argument for censorship (though Plato
thought it was) but it may be an argument for conceding that there are circumstances where the demands of
art and of social comity come genuinely into conflict.

••
••
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James M. Gustafson

HUMAN CONFIDENCE
AND RATIONAL ACTIVITY
The Dialectic of Faith and Reason in University Life

I am deeply honored to address a convocation of
Valparaiso University on such a significant occasion. I
hope that my thoughts and the ways in which I express them in some measure appropriately honor President Schnabel and his years as the head of this university. As a theologian whose career has been in very
secular universities I have observed from the outside
the ways in which church-related universities and colleges have sought to be loyal to a historic religious
heritage while pursuing aims and aspirations for high
quality of research and teaching in the arts and sciences and in their professional schools. And I have
very deep respect for faculties who are devoted to
teaching while engaged in their various areas of research. The recognition that Valparaiso University has
received, I believe, shows appreciation for its work and
life from a broader public community.
In my letter of acceptance of this invitation I noted
that I had in my possession a carbon copy of a lecture
delivered here years ago by my mentor, colleague, and
friend, H . Richard Niebuhr. Its title is "Martin Luther
and the Renewal of Human Confidence." It has never
been published. In a way I build from that lecture.
But I will focus on some preoccupations of my own
that have been nourished by participation in cross-disciplinary work as well as by my concentration on theology and ethics in the Christian tradition.

James M. Gustafson moves this fall to Emory University as
Henry R. Luce Professor of Humanities and Comparative
Studies. Prior to that he served as University Professor of
Theological Ethics in the Divinity School of the University of
Chicago. His many books include two volumes of Ethics
from a Theocentric Perspective. This essay was first presented to the Valparaiso University community last spring at
a convocation in honor of Robert V. Schnabel upon his retirement as President of the University.
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II

In many areas of human experience, including
academic and intellectual life, we are prone to make
very clear and sharp distinctions between contrasting
terms. Indeed, the process of defining terms and concepts requires such precision. The contrasting terms
begin to function as polar opposites for us. Whatever
the terms refer to, it must be one or the other of the
same kind.
Think of the terms of good and evil. In Roman
Catholic moral theology we have the principle of double effect in which there has to be a simultaneous outcome of a good and evil effect if it is applicable. But
the intention can never be for the evil effect, and in
the outcome the intended good effect must be proportionately more significant than the unintended evil effect. But, I would suppose, in much of our moral activity the outcomes are often intricately commingled
good and evil. In English we do not have one word we
can use easily to fit this mixture.
In some studies of philosophy and theology we are
presented with a sharp distinction between freedom
and necessity, or freedom and destiny. Yet, I think, in
a good deal of common experience our self-determination is always qualified by the necessary restraints on
our activity that are there by virtue of our bodily existence, our networks of social life, the responsibilities
we have for our roles as students and professors. My
"office," my professional role, limits my freedom, my
capacity to determine for and by myself what activities
are appropriate. The polarity oversimplifies human
experience, and often the most difficult intellectual
and practical problems come up not at the extremes
suggested by the poles, but on the continuing line that
joins the two.
When we look at the tradition in Western thought
that deals with matters of religion we are faced over
and over with literature that differentiates between
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faith and reason. This is not the occasion to rehearse
the proposed relations between these contrasting terms
and that to which they conventionally refer. For many
secular persons in university life they refer to mutually
exclusive opposites: faith is not reasonable in any way
and reason does not include any elements of faith. (I
have been frequently angered in my participation in
universities by the religious illiteracy of some of my
very vocal secular colleagues for whom all religion is
dogmatic fundamentalism, or blind leaps to authority,
or totally irrational. They would not tolerate equal
ignorance and dogmatism in any outsider speaking of
their own areas of research and teaching.)
Niebuhr's reflections on faith pick up traditional
meanings and set them into a wider and modern context. Faith, he pointed out in several places, is confidence or trust and it is loyalty or fidelity. As such,
"faith" is not confined to religion. Confidence and
fidelity are present in common human experience of
a variety of sorts. That insight, too, was not utterly
novel. One thinks of the exposition of the First Commandment in Luther's Large Catechism: "To have a
god is nothing else than to trust and believe him with
our whole heart. . . . The trust and faith of the heart
alone make both God and an idol." And, to be sure,
the temptations of idolatry, to excessive or total confidence in that which is less than God, less than universal, are present in all of life. But the burden of my reflections this morning is not prophetic critique of
idolatries in universities. I want to call to our attention
the deep and broad pervasiveness of human confidence in university life, teaching, and research.
One need not be a theologian to perceive this. A
great deal of recent history and philosophy of science
has pointed this out. One thinks of Michael Polanyi's
book, Personal Knowledge, with its exposition of "tacit"
knowledge, and the ways in which that influences
areas of scholarly investigation. There are beliefs, not
all of which we are conscious, which inform our investigations. One thinks of the writings of Thomas Kuhn,
Stephen Toulmin, Norwood Hanson and others who
have provided accounts of the development of the sciences.
While they differ among themselves, a common
strand notes the existence of human confidence in the
received traditions, theories, and methods of research
that characterize much of scientific investigation. Like
political and religious communities, so also scientific
communities are the bearers of traditions into which
members become socialized, consenting (in a way) to
much learning, much theorizing, as the ground from
which teaching and investigation moves forward. And
there are evidences that excessive confidence in what
is received sometimes blinds investigators to important
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features of what they are studying.
What Niebuhr called human confidence is a pervasive fact of life in universities. It is not pervasive
enough for some prophetic critics of universities; I
take it that one way to understand Allan Bloom's interpretation of the perils of higher education is to say
that for him there is insufficient prejudice, i.e. prejudgment, in the minds of students to orient and direct them through the course of their studies. Their
minds are too open.

One way to understand Allan Bloom's
interpretation of the perils of higher
education is to say that for him
there is insufficient prejudice, i.e.
pre-judgment, in the minds of
students to orient and direct them
through the course of their studies.
Their minds are too open.
Put another way, perhaps too strongly, all of us
argue at some point from authority. All of us trust in
research and theories that we have not ourselves conducted and proved. This is, I take it, as true in physics
and chemistry as it is in the humanities and religious
studies. This trust, this human confidence, is not blind
compliance with what is received. We, at some point,
argue from authority because the demonstration of
that from which we argue is itself authoritative. That
is, we can have confidence in what we ourselves have
not established or proved because what is received has
been developed and transmitted by competent and
knowledgeable investigators. And it has been tested
within a community of competent people. To have
confidence in the work of our predecessors as well as
the work of our colleagues is a matter of consenting
to what they teach us.
Consent, as a form of human confidence, is not
blind resignation based on the reputations of others;
it is not believing something or someone simply because of who wrote it. Consenting, I believe, involves
our intellects, but it also involves reliance on what we
have received based on its authoritative argumentations and presentation.
I think none of us, teachers or students, would get
very far in our work if our primary disposition was, in
every instance of what we research, read, or study, to
have fundamental mistrust, an utter skepticism toward
the material. An infinite regression of skepticism or
doubting would paralyze all of us, faculty and students
The Cresset

alike. We not only question what is received; we also
have confidence in much we have received and we
proceed from that in which we trust to explore new
possibilities. At some point we consent. But this is not
traditionalism; it is not submission in a blind way to the
authority of that past.
A former colleague of mine wrote an article many
years ago on the dilemma of the religious intellectual.
Put too pithily, it was that one believed what one was
questioning and one questioned what one was believing. That is not simply a matter of the intellectual in
the sphere of religious thought; it is, in a way, simply
a description of a process by which intellectual and
academic activity go on quite broadly. One has confidence in what is received while at the same time questioning the adequacy of what is received. This is why,
I think, Stephen Toulmin can describe the development of knowledge in evolutionary terms. New forms
of life develop out of old and usually not by destruction of the old .
But one must honestly and straightforwardly admit
that in different areas of university life there are different presumptions in favor of, or against, what is received. Consenting to the received, confidence in the
received, seems to occur at different points in the
process. And it is not the same for all teachers and
students in the same field of study. One does not need
to know Aristotelian biology and the history of biological ideas to be a good investigator and teacher of biology today. One does not need to know pre-Socratic
theories about the nature of all things in order to contribute to current investigations of physics, or even
metaphysics. In contrast with this, for some of us at
least, one cannot be a competent student of contemporary literature or student of religion without not only
reading great texts from the past but also having confidence in the power of those texts to disclose certain
aspects of reality that concern us. But even for the current student of biology and physics there are established theories and principles which direct reflections
into phenomena and from which new problems are
designed and articulated .
I have labored this point long enough. But I state
it briefly once again . If faith refers to human confidence, then faith, human confidence (and also faith as
faithfulness or loyalty about which I have said nothing), is a necessary condition for learning and research. In a general way this is the case as much in the
sciences and social sciences as it is in the humanities,
including the study of religion and theology.
Now we turn to rational activity. I choose to speak
of rational activity rather than "reason" per se. Why
do I do that? I suspect that even in higher mathematics and logic persons are reasoning about something.
September, 1988

To be sure we often respond to something by saying
"It stands to reason," but I suspect we do not always
take that to mean that what was said avoided all possible problems of formal logic. I think we usually
mean that what was said was reasonable with reference
to the subject under discussion. That is, one could give
reasons to support what was averred. And I use rational activity because, as many articles and books have
argued, the kinds of reasons we give are related to the
content of our studies and investigations. To be sure
we are all under the constraint to avoid the pain of
contradiction and to observe other rudimentary rules
of argument and discourse. Something cannot be what
it is and its opposite at the same time.
In universities when we begin to converse across the
boundaries of our disciplines and fields we quickly
grasp that, descriptively at least, different ways of arguing are appropriate for different areas, and that different persons argue differently even about the same
area. Let me illustrate the latter from the realm of
morality, of ethical thought.
Anyone who has taken an introductory course in
ethics knows that there is a difference between utilitarian ethics and Kantian, or deontic, ethics. Utilitarian
ethics requires that we assess the possible outcomes of
alternative courses of action so we can maximize what
we judge to be desirable outcomes and minimize the
undesirable outcomes. Deontic ethics requires that we
adhere to generalizable moral principles and act in accordance with the maxim or rules they support. For
the latter an act is right insofar as it accords with the
principle. Some of you surely know Kant's famous
essay, "Is it ever right to lie from a benevolent motive?" The issue is whether you can justify lying for
the sake of some beneficial outcome.
Perhaps to a person deeply committed to one position or the other, the contrasting one appears "unreasonable." But that is not the case to all of us. Both
patterns are reasoning about morality. Both are ways
of arguing about what makes human actions right and
good. There are clearly different judgments about
what is most important in deciding that; in a sense
each has a different center of gravity in its understanding of morality. While both share a common
focus on morality, their rational activity about it differs
because of differences of judgment about what makes
actions morally commendable or praiseworthy.
I suspect that in their ordinary moral lives most
people reason about their actions in ways that appeal
to what are two different moral theories in the eyes of
scholars. We do assess the possible consequences of alternative courses of action, and the consequence of not
doing anything at all. Thus if we could save an innocent life by withholding information from someone
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who would use it to take that life, most of us would
do that. But at the same time we would not agree that
one can justify speaking falsely for the sake of some
trivially convenient outcome.
My point is that in much of human experience when
we think about what we ought to do, or ought not to
do, we use more than one pattern of rational activity.
The utilitarian is not unreasonable; s/he reasons about
outcomes of actions and about how to determine
whether they are good or bad, or mixed. The deontologist is not unreasonable; s/he reasons about principles, their generalizability or universalizability, and
how they are applicable to a particular set of circumstances.
It takes no statement of evidence in a university to
make clear that investigators in the field of enzymology or cell biology are engaged in rational activity
about the entities under examination. Nor that
metaphysicians are engaged in rational activity about
what it means for something to be rather than not to
be, or about the ultimate reality of all things. Nor that
professors of law are engaged in rational activity about
the justification for laws, and the application of laws
and judicial precedents to quite precisely distinctive
cases. Nor that historians are engaged in rational activ-
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ity about factors that seem to condition, if not determine, a sequence of political or cultural events, even
when the intentions of the actors in these events is
necessary for us to understand them, if not explain
them. All of this, it seems to me, is beyond serious dispute.
We also know how difficult it is when each of us,
student or faculty member, undertakes to grasp the
concepts, the modes of establishing evidences, and the
modes of argumentation in fields of study that are
novel to us. To apprehend the importance of technical
information is not the only difficulty. It is also that our
own rational activity is context-related; it has developed in a particular community of specialized scholarship as that has been in focus on particular issues.
It is not that a historian is unreasonable to a plasma
physicist, but that the canons of rational activity in
each field are appropriate to its subject matter and are
established over time in a community of scholars
within that specialization.
The study of theology is also a rational activity. It
involves in fact a variety of rational activities. The
scholar assesses, for example, the adequacy of the
exegesis of biblical materials used by a theologian. Or
s/he assesses in a historical framework the extent to
which the formulation of a theological position is conditioned by the historical context in which it is developed. Or, if theology is studied in a more constructive or systematic mode, one is engaged in rational activity about God, the Divine Reality, and God's relations to human beings, to society, culture, and history,
and to the natural world. God is an appropriate object
of rational activity; arguments about what constitutes
adequate conditions for what is claimed to be known
about God are rational. They are appropriate to the
subject matter. Questions asked in other disciplines are
also asked by theologians: what counts for adequate
evidences for believing in God? What inferences are
drawn from the evidences adduced, and how are they
marshalled into a coherent argument? And so forth.
III

I hope I have established, at least provisionally, the
grounds for thinking about university life and activity
in very general terms as an intricate commingling of
human confidence and rational activity. All this is
done to serve a larger purpose.
If what I have delineated is plausible, then in a significant way it establishes conditions for both general
and somewhat theoretical inferences on the one hand,
and some practical inferences on the other. These inferences pertain to how a university like Valparaiso (or
any other) can sustain and develop in modest ways
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some centers of coherence and integration as it also
pursues proper specialization.
First, if we can think about the continuity and commingling of human confidence and rational activity as
quite common through all the diverse activities of a
university we have the door ajar, at least, to a room
in which some of the suspicion we have of each other
can be mitigated. I would never go so far as to argue
what seems to me to be involved in some religious
thinkers' response to what I have described, namely
that the sciences work more by faith than many persons will admit, and therefore they are intellectually
softer than the public believes. Consequently theology
or other humanistic and social scientific studies have a
kind of license they did not have before.
But I would develop the argument that the recognition of the degree of commonality I have described
begins to make possible significant discourse about
phenomena, realities, and even concepts that are
shared among specialized disciplines. A kind of intellectual humility is appropriate which is a necessary
condition if we are to interact on matters that are relevant to a number of fields of endeavor. An acknowledgement of the extent to which the rational activity
of each of our disciplines is context-related and involves forms of human confidence can have the outcome of opening each of us to mutual education, to
mutual correction, and to modest increments of
growth in understanding and knowledge.
Second, we might become more open to recognizing
those matters of teaching and research that escape the
nets of our specializations. We know that this goes on
within restricted areas of various sciences as well as
other fields. New areas develop as physicists become
biophysicists, or as psychologists become neurologists.
And we know that issues of public life, very properly
a concern of universities, can never be reduced only to
economics, only to political science, only to ethics, only
to sociology or psychology.
And we know that within defined areas of specialization there are arguments that are as forcefully pursued by the partisans of one or the other as are arguments between specialities when they address the same
phenomenon. One needs only to be a general reader
to know that this is the case in economics, in literary
critical theory, in philosophy, in theology, and many
other places. Excessive confidence in a particular
theory or approach to a subject matter functions often
to define what the subject matter is, and in so doing
some things we at least intuit as being important are
missed.
I resort to an anecdote to illustrate this. About
twenty years ago I participated in a conference on
ethics and public policy. A very distinguished moral
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philosopher presented a paper contrasting two proposals for urban planning and argued for one of them
on the basis of his technical and quite abstract moral
theory. The first response from the floor came from
a city official from Montreal who described what he
had to take into account in urban planning: special
economic interests, political interest groups, legal restraints, and much more. He then asked the moral
philosopher how his theory would help him. The response he got was that his problems belonged to political philosophy and not to moral philosophy. My point
is that a particular disciplinary approach defined for
this philosopher what a problem, indeed, a practical
problem, was. The urban planner, quite correctly,
showed how the problem of urban planning was more
complex than the presentation could address.

If the university is to be a fruitful
location for exploring larger issues
of life, perhaps we need to
acknowledge, each of us as scholars,
teachers, and students, that all our
knowing involves "faith," human
confidence in what we have received.
This is only one example I could adduce of matters
intellectual and practical that can (to speak colloquially) fall between the disciplinary tracks. To recognize
the context-relatedness of our rational activity might
free us to explore creatively the margins of that activity and to open possibilities of discourse with other relevant fields in facing significant issues.
Let me further illustrate this with reference to work
in which I am soon to be engaged. I have designed a
seminar for faculty persons under the title, "Human
being/Being human." The first invites participation of
more explanatory disciplines: bioanthropology, biology, psychology, sociology, history, and others. The
second invites participation of more normative disciplines, those that are concerned with the meaning and
indeed the calling of humans. It takes little imagination
to grasp the fact that our humanness is looked at from
many disciplinary perspectives in a university. Does
any one of them provide a sufficient explanation or
understanding of the human?
The philosopher working in theories of action is
likely to focus on the capacity to have intentions and
purposes as that which distinguishes human life. The
human geneticist is likely to point out the distinctive
chromosomal structure of our species in contrast with
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other species. The cultural anthropologist is likely to
explain humanity in the contexts of its particular and
different cultures, as might other social scientists.
Perhaps a theologian might prefer to write about what
is essential to human nature, and thus what is shared
by all regardless of their social and cultural locations.
A religious thinking influenced by Kierkegaard or
Reinhold Niebuhr will call attention to the anxiety
caused by the fact that we are spirits, and not just
physical phenomena, and show how this lends to the
sins of pride on the one hand or sloth on the other
hand if we do not have some profound trust or faith.
One who has read Rabbi Hesche! might denigrate
what can be learned from all possible scientific explanations of the human because the meaning of being
human is never accounted for in such accounts. What
is the relation between various explanations of the
human and what we value about human life?
Years ago I read a paper by a population geneticist
who proposed that the human gene pool be legally declared public property so that legislation and regulations could be enforced to keep the gene pool from
deteriorating over a long future time span. That is a
different center of value from what might be adduced
by the artist who values most human capacities for
creativity. A knotty philosophical issue emerges that
can be properly addressed to all participants: what is
the relation between what are defended as the facts
about human being and the value of being human?
That can be turned a bit: if one has an ideal or normative view of what being human is or ought to be,
what are the necessary physical, social, and other conditions for its actualization?
In what relationships do we interpret and understand the human? Karl Barth, the theologian, argues
that real "man" is the human being in relation to God.
Someone else might argue that the real human is located in what it shares and then what it does not share
with other forms of life.
Let me tie this back to the title of this address. Each
conceivable approach to explaining, understanding,
and valuing human life involves a commingling of rational activity and human confidence. The fact that
biopsychologists have not persuaded theologians or
cultural anthropologists that their arguments are sufficient is evidence that the phenomenon of the human
seems to escape the net of a single discipline or perspective.
But "human being/being human" is a matter of very
great importance not only to the intellectually curious
who might enjoy defending one or another perspective which in the eyes of their opponents is reductionistic. It is also a matter of great moral importance
m our culture. The issue is imbedded in many con-
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troversies. For example it is imbedded in issues of
medical care: how defective must a defective infant be
if one considers not sustaining its life? What degree of
neural system and brain function is necessary to back
the continuation of life support systems? Or, take a
quite different arena: ecology and the dangers we
pose to the sustained viability of nature. If, as has
been argued, all of nature exists for the sake of
human life since humans are made in the image of
God, or since the lower always exists to serve the
higher and humans are the highest we know, is that a
dangerous understanding of the human? Does another
interpretation which accepts our continuities with all
of nature, rather than our superiority, militate against
such dangers? My point is that imbedded in very practical concerns are differences in perceptions, explanations, understandings, and valuations of the human. If
there is an institution in modern society that has the
resources to explore these matters, it is the university.
But if the university is to be a fruitful location for
exploring larger issues of life, perhaps we need to acknowledge, each of us as scholars, teachers, and students, that all our knowing involves "faith," human
confidence in what we have received. And all our
knowing involves "reason," rational activity about issues that are appropriate to the subject matter, but not
sufficient to embrace in isolation much that is worthy
of our disciplined and sustained intellectual attention .

••
••

She in the Garden
After the crocuses
curl into husks, she reads
signs in green stems and weaves
earth through white hands , guesses
births, pokes at primroses.
Crouching, she sways and weeds
lavender; narrow leaves
wake when she coaxes.
In the oregano
roots she prods; then he's there,
home at noon, brushing past
tansy before he goes.
Tansy stays in the air
as she waves with the grass.

Kristin Searfoss
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R. Keith Schoppa

CONTEMPORARY CHINA AND
THE GHOST OF CONFUCIUS
The Dialectic of Past and Present in Chinese Culture

In November 1986 an international conference was
held in Beijing to discuss the relevance of Confucianism for China today. That might be seen in
some circles as a startling development, for little more
than a decade ago in one of the dying gasps of China's
greatest twentieth-century revolutionary, Mao Zedong,
Confucius had been the target of a bitter national
campaign. Such a campaign was, in fact, nothing very
new. China's greatest teacher, Confucius, who lived
roughly 200 years ago, has been roundly condemned
throughout this century by Communists and some
non-Communists alike. The rallying cry of the famous
May 4th movement of the 1910s and 1920s out of
which revolutionary China emerged was "Down with
Confucius and Sons."
Whether Confucius has been extolled, condemned,
or simply analyzed, his ghost has haunted and continues to haunt the makers of China's ongoing political
revolution. Less than half a mile from where I lived
in Hangzhou in 1986 was a traditional memorial arch
placed amid modern apartment buildings. Traditional
arches were built to commemorate particularly moral
men and women, specifically filial sons and chaste
widows. Though they had been painted over, the characters inscribed on this arch read "Long live Mao
Zedong's Thought." Certainly these obscured characters symbolize that Mao is now only a ghostly presence
in China. More significantly symbolic, I think, is the
use of a traditional arch with all its cultural import to
extol Mao-in short, the ghostly presence of Chinese

R. Keith Schoppa is Professor and Chairman of the Department of History at Valparaiso University. He is the author of Chinese Elites and Political Change (Harvard
University Press, 1982). His latest book, Xiang LakeNine Centuries of Chinese Life, is scheduled for publication soon by Yale University Press.
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tradition is evident m the world of contemporary
China.'

Whether Confucius has been extolled,
condemned, or simply analyzed,
his ghost has haunted and continues
to haunt the makers of China's
ongoing modem political revolution.
This essay suggests that in the years of Mao
Zedong's leadership ( 1949-1976), Confucius was a
ghost from which Mao could not free himself. The
years of Deng Xiaoping (1979 to the present), in contrast, evidence Confucius' partial resurrection from an
early twentieth-century grave. To provide a background for both, I offer a brief survey of pertinent
Confucian ethics. 2
II

In Confucius' view, China was a society of points, of
discrete units. Traditional Chinese ethics is noted for
its particularity, not its universality: as a proverb put
it: "Sweep the snow from your doorstep but not the
frost from your neighbor's roof." Ethics were familycentered and the family was a patriarchal grou p
bound together by the virtue of filial piety. Filial piety
meant respect to the family line shown in specific care
'By contemporary China I mean, following the practice
of Chinese historians, China since 1949.
•Any number of works offer overviews of the Confucian
ethical system. Two recent surveys are Richard J. Smith,
China's Cultural Heritage: the Ch'ing Dynasty, 1644-1912

(Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1983) and Lloyd Eastman,
Family, Field and Ancestors (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1988.)
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.
of parents, reverence of ancestors, and producing children to perpetuate the family. The family unit properly lived in the locality of the ancestors and linked
past, present, and future.
Within the family, the predominant ethical dynamic
was that of "authority-submission." Confucius talked of
five crucial bonds. Three of these were familial, all
structured on this dynamic: father-son, husband-wife,
and elder brother-younger brother. Commemorative
arches dotted areas of the Chinese landscape honoring
filial sons and chaste widows. They joined tombs of
ancestors often placed on some of the best farm lands.
For a smoothly functioning, harmonious societyand that was the goal of all Chinese philosophy-each
person had to fulfill the social role of his name, i.e.,
the son must be the son and respect the father; the
father must be the father, controlling and directing
the son . In addition, each social being must follow the
proper social procedures and forms, which often became so important that they seemed to take on the
character of ends rather than means.

Within the family, the predominant
ethical dynamic was that of
"authority-submission." Confucius
talked of five crucial bonds. Three
were familial, all structured on this
dynamic: father-son, husband-wife,
and elder brother-younger brother.
In the polity as a whole the authority-subject nexus
was also crucial. The fourth social bond in Confucian
though t was the relationship of the ruler to the ruled.
T he traditional Chinese ruler was the emperor or Son
of Heaven who, by the late imperial period, theoretically held absolute authority, an authority which extended beyond China to the universe as a whole. In
rituals, the emperor acted so that the universe would
function harmoniously. Subject to the emperor but
with authority over the people was the bureaucracy,
composed of the scholar-elite class. Often called the
gentry, these men had passed the civil service examination based upon an education in the classics and
held various level degrees which made them as intellectuals the political and social leaders of the society.
Education then served as a most important vehicle
by which authority was established. The teacher-disciple relationship through which one studied to become
a degree-holder operated according to the authoritysubj ect dynamic. A man submitted to the training of
his teacher in order to become an authority figure
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himself. For the masses of Chinese, the inculcation of
the value of submission was promoted by the state
through frequent public readings of socio-political regulations and ethical norms and the promotion of models to be emulated.
Finally, traditional Chinese culture was marked in
the natural world and the metaphysical by the authority- or (in this case) power-subject nexus. The impotence of the Chinese farmer before the forces of nature is an obvious likely source of this dynamic-pictured in so many Chinese landscapes where nature
dwarfs human beings, making them seem insignificant.
Envisioning life in such natural, political, and social
environments, one can easily understand how the concept of fate emerged as a rationalization of one's place
in the universe, the polity, and the family-with the
authority figures stressing the fate of the respective
subordinates and their necessary acceptance of it.

III
Mao's goal was a modernized socialist nation that
could gain the wealth and power which China had
lacked in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He
faced the same question that has confronted all twentieth-century Chinese leaders: how is the new society
to be restructured, or, put another way, how does one
take a society of points and, as in a dot-to-dot drawing,
link them to bring about a meaningful picture? Mao
used some Marxist categories or groupings, but more
importantly, given the fact that China lacked a viable
proletariat to serve as the revolutionary class, he focused on the peasants who made up 85 per cent of the
Chinese populace. Establishing social groupings-landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasantsand using these categories politically, Mao sought to
provide individuals in family or local groups an identity beyond "points. "
Yet Mao's primary concern was not social identity
and cohesion but building a modern socialist nation.
Thus the basic question: how does the state mobilize
the energy and resources of new categories of the
people in order to achieve that goal? How can the
traditional subjects of authority be transformed to
seize and use authority for themselves? That's what
Mao's revolution was all about. His answer was to
stand traditional society on its head. The authoritysubject dynamic remained Mao's dominant paradigm
and concern, except that the authority figures now became the peasants, and the former political leaders,
the intellectuals, became the subjects.
Mao's teachings imbued peasants with all the elements of authority which the intellectuals had once
held. Peasants possessed moral authority: they are, he
The Cresset

said, "dear-sighted"; they "have never been wrong on
the general direction of the revolution"; they are enthusiastic and they have a will to succeed (the matter
of will is central).s They are teachers: intellectuals,
writers, and artists, he argued, must learn from them.•
In Mao's perspective peasants were transformed from
people with no right to speak to people with the right
to rule. 5 Through revolution, he asserted, peasants
had cast off their subject status. In a poem, Mao described them as lifting their lances with red pennons
against those who held the whips. 6
Mao thus took the traditional political-ethical authority in Chinese culture and shifted it to the peasants. He clearly distrusted the intellectuals, even if he
recognized them as necessary for modernization. Before they could be used and useful, he insisted, they
first had to submit to the peasants and to the Communist Party. Such submission meant remolding
thoughts and feelings through labor and through experiences of struggle. Even then, Mao's prognosis on
intellectuals was notably cautious: "a thorough change
in world outlook takes a very long time and we should
work patiently and not be impetuous." 7 When Mao
called in 1956 for the blooming of a hundred flowers
(i.e., for the intellectuals to voice their ideas openly),
he was staggered by the bitter attacks on the system
that followed; as a result, the flowers were trampled
underfoot: intellectuals were suppressed, many of
them sent to the countryside for re-education.
Mao's difficulties in the last two decades of his rule
came in part because of his inability to perpetuate the
new authority-subject pattern. The revolutionary
model of peasant rule and intellectual subjection presented several problems in the effort to mobilize the
populace for the making of the new China. For if intellectuals are submerged, ideas and options are obviously restricted. And if Mao depended, as he desired,
on the peasants, he had to deal with what even he recognized as their low political consciousness. It was this
' See Mao's "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant
Movement in Hunan" in Selected Readings from the Works
of Mao Tsetung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1971),
pp. 29 and 35. [Hereafter, Works]. See also in Works, "On
the Question of Agricultural Co-operation," especially pp.
389-395.
•In Works, see Mao's "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art," p. 264.
5
Compare Mao's description of peasants in traditional society in the "Report on an Investigation ... " (note 3) and
that in his famous essay "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," Works, pp. 371-386.
6
See Mao's 1959 poem "Return to Shaoshan" in Jerome
Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution (London: Oxford
University Press, 1965), p. 350.
'Mao, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions
Among the People," Works, p. 458.
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problem that undoubtedly prompted Mao's famous
"poor and blank thesis" set forward in 1958.
He wrote: "Apart from their other characteristics,
China's 600 million people have two remarkable
peculiarities; they are first of all poor and secondly
blank. That may seem like a bad thing, but it is really
a good thing. Poor people want change, want to do
things, want revolution. A clean sheet of paper has no
blotches and so the newest and most beautiful words
can be written on it, the newest and most beautiful
pictures can be painted on it." 8 There is an obvious
tension between the authority with which Mao imbued
the peasants and the "poor and blank" quality he attributes to them here. The crucial question becomes:
who will write the words; who will paint the pictures?
The answer at least until the late 1950s was the
Communist Party, the vanguard of the revolution, the
instrument of authority in carrying out policy and
combating deviations. The party was "to collect the
opinions of the masses, sift and refine them, and return them to the masses who take them and put them
into practice."• Beginning in the late 1950s, however,
as Mao projected rapid economic development in the
Great Leap Forward, party leaders came to seem to
Mao like obstacles to progress as they cautioned about
the undue speed with which Mao was moving. When
the Great Leap Forward with its backyard smelters
and gigantic communal mess halls proved a disastrous
failure, Mao lost considerable power: the years 19601966 saw him with very little support in Beijing.
For Mao, that situation was intolerable. Ultimately
he came to see that he himself would be the writer of
words and the painter of pictures on the peasants'
"blank sheets." Thus the origins of the cataclysmic
Cultural Revolution . The story of the Chinese revolution is in part a tortured search for new authority in
social hierarchy and political action, a search bound by
the age-old Confucian paradigm of authority-submission. Mao destroyed the old authority in order to unleash the energy of those long subordinate. But in the
shifts and turns of political change and in the face of
what he saw as the perversion of his revolution, Mao
finally worked to subordinate the new authorities and
install his personal authority with totalitarian force. In
one of the closing scenes of his masterful The Last Emperor, Bertolucci depicts the 1960s cult of Mao, shown
looming on a billboard as Red Guards dance through
the streets below. The last emperor, the filmmaker
seemed to be saying, was clearly not Aisin Gioro Puyi.
•Hung-ch'i (Red Flag), June I, 1958, pp. 3-4. Quoted in
Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After (New York: The

Free Press, 1986), p. 213.
•Mao, "Yenan Forum on Literature and Art," Works, p.
272.
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At Mao's end, then, we have to return to the memorial arch in Hangzhou. For ultimately, the authority of
the Confucian cultural heritage overcame Mao's promethean effort to cast it off. That heritage framed
Mao's response to China's problems, a response which
highlighted the hierarchial authority-subject model of
relationships, the ethical-political nature of leadership,
the centrality of education, and the central role of the
intelligentsia (either as leaders or as targets).

While Mao wrestled Confucius almost
to the death in the Cultural
Revolution, today's Chinese leaders
have resurrected him, not
unthinkingly, but with a pragmatic
hope he can aid in modernization.
If the transcendent dynamic of the Chinese political
culture was the Confucian authority-subject heritage
from which Mao was unable in a practical political
sense to extricate himself, the theoretical and
psychological import of Mao's attack on old authority
was, nonetheless, his greatest contribution to and his
greatest success in the Chinese Revolution. Like traditional intellectual-political leaders, Mao wrote a considerable amount of poetry. His poetic vision provides
evidence of the broad nature of his attack on authority, specifically the authority (or power) of nature and
of fate. "Swimming," written in 1956, is only one of
his many poems which illustrate the thrust of the revolutionary spirit. 10
just then a drink of water in the south,
Now a taste of fuh in the north.
A swim cuts across the Long River;
A glance gauges the sky's width.
Let the wind blow and waves strike,
This surpasses an aimless stroll in the court.
Today's leisure is well spent.
Standing at a ford, the Master once said:
"Thus life flows into the past!"
Breeze shakes the masts
While Tortoise and Snake Hills are motionless.
A grand project is being conceivedA bridge will fly across
And tum a barrier into a path.
To the west, new cliffs will arise;
Mount Wu's clouds and rains will be kept from the
countryside.
Calm lakes will spring up in the gorges.
Were the goddess still alive
She would be amazed by the changes on this earth.

°Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, p. 346.
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The emphasis upon activity and forward-looking
change (note the use of future tense in the second
stanza) is in notable contrast to the lack of action
("standing") and the backward-looking comment of the
Master (Confucius). Mao here speaks of cataclysmic
change in nature and society: one can change the
world by remaking nature, restructuring society, and
remolding the human being. This is the heart of the
Maoist revolution: the power of the human will can
overcome fate and chart a new destiny.'' This world
view of hope and optimism, I would argue, has helped
bring the Chinese away from a long-held outlook of
resignation and acceptance. If Mao was unable to extinguish completely the ghost of Confucius, the optimistic nationalism and personal goals of Chinese
today still reflect Mao's impact on the lives of the billion plus Chinese.
IV
It has been twelve years since Mao's death. The
policies of the regime of Deng Xiaoping have led almost to the extinction of the spirit of Mao. The responsibility system which Deng instituted has opened
the way for sprouts of capitalism and some diminution
of state economic control. The openness to the international scene has overwhelmed Mao's ideas of self-reliance; 40,000 Chinese students are currently studying
abroad, 27,000 of them in the U.S. In such a pragmatic aura, it is perhaps not surprising that a conference
on the possible role of Confucianism today would be
held. While Mao wrestled Confucius almost to the
death in the Cultural Revolution, today's Chinese leaders have resurrected him, not unthinkingly, but with a
pragmatic view to see what Confucius can bring to the
modernization effort.
Since 1985 there has been a spate of articles in
Chinese journals and newspapers on China's cultural
legacy and the 1980s. These writings reveal two different attitudes: a comparatively positive attitude toward
Chinese traditional culture to accord with the postMao outlook, and a more negative view reflecting that
of many of China's most important twentieth-century
revolutionaries. ' 2
The writers in the positive school assume that the
very survival of an independent and unified Chinese
''See Mao's brief speech before the Seventh National Communist Party Congress in June 1945: "The Foolish Old
Man who Removed the Mountains" in Works, pp. 320323.
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state today after the internal upheavals and foreign
aggression of the last century and a half argues for the
existence of strong enduring values in the cultural
heritage: China, they rightfully point out, possesses
the world's longest continuous integrated culture. Certain cultural values, the positive school suggests, can be
utilized in and adapted to the modern world. For one
example, the traditional Confucian concept of the collectivity as the fundamental social unit, rather than the
individual as in the West, emphasizes the public as opposed to the private. Upholding the ideal that the
value of a human being is realized only in his or her
relationship with fellow human beings ties the destiny
of the individual to that of society and facilitates the
goal of modernizing the largest collectivity, the nation.
Furthermore, a proper authority-subject dynamic in
the context of a modern state mobilized for action can
bring about goal-directed activity to strengthen national feeling and help achieve state political and social
aims. (A similar concept of the loyalty of subordinate
to master in Japanese culture has been seen as a
source of the rapidity of Japan's modernization.)
Utilized in a new context and instilled with new content, traditional values might thus play a positive role
for reconstructing China. The great economic success
of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea,
all of which developed initially out of Confucian culture or with basic Chinese cultural values, would seem
to provide at least partial corroboration of the positive
school.
The negative school argues that Confucianism above
all created relationships of personal dependency in the
family, in education, and in political relationships.
Such relationships run counter to the spirit of modernization, which must bring into full play individual
creativity. The Confucian and Maoist obsession with
social and political authority is an impediment to the
process of modernization. In addition, the adherents
argue, emphasis upon human relationships encourages
pre-modern values of "rule by man" rather than the
modern values of "rule by law" in working and legal
relationships. An emphasis upon feeling and sentiment
so crucial in traditional culture is a powerful obstacle
to modernization.
The negative school asserts that traditional culture,
despite its glory, beauty, and contribution to human
civilization in the past, has become on balance a burden for today's China that must be cast off. Certainly
any examination of contemporary Chinese life illustrates some of the concerns of the negative school.
The continuing emphasis upon the family and the desire within families for a son have made long-term effective birth control difficult, and birth control is a
necessity if China is to deal with its tremendous popuSeptember, 1988

lation problem. China remains a society where personal connections are a crucial way of life: two results
of this social situation are widespread use of "the back
door" (i.e., circumventing regularized procedures by
bringing personal relationships into play), and the
rapid development of factions. Traditional emphasis
upon forms and procedures in the imperial bureaucracy has been perpetuated in the overblown bureaucratized structures of the Communist state.
A recently completed film, King of Children, by Chen
Kaige, China's most internationally acclaimed young
filmmaker, portrays the destructiveness of China's cultural traditions on the creativity and individualism of
the Chinese." Set during the Cultural Revolution, the
film recounts the story of Lao Cha, sent from the city
to teach Chinese at a thatch-and-bamboo school in
rural western China. The textbook required by the
headmaster is a compilation of Maoist pieties which
the children must memorize: "The East is Red. The
sun rises. Tens of millions of people turn their red
hearts to the sun." Aware that recitation of Mao's
maxims is no more beneficial than memorizing Confucian classics in years past, Lao Cha eventually scraps
the textbook and instructs students to write essays
about their lives, which they do with considerable
beauty. On their discovery of Lao Cha's techniques,
however, local authorities dismiss him.
In two scenes, Chen pointedly attacks the grip of the
past and of authority in the Chinese tradition. At one
point, Lao Cha is startled by the sounds of ominous
chanting and drums that come from the Chinese characters in the dictionary he is reading. Chen later
explained that "my concern [here] was our inheritance
of the ancient Chinese spirit and what effect it has on
our lives." Specifically, he noted, "All of Chinese history and culture lie in those pages. People can create
culture but culture controls them."
At the end of the film, authorities burn away the
lush, uncultivated vegetation on the hills surrounding
the school-the vigorous growth had been a symbol of
innocent youth. Lao Cha's comment as he leaves the
school for the last time can serve as a reflection of the
authoritarian thrust immanent in traditional Chinese
culture: "I've been here seven years, and I don't know
how many times they've set the hills on fire."
Even if Chen's bleak view of the nature of Confucius' ghost is inaccurate, it is obvious that the spirit
of Confucius and traditional culture is a force that will
continue in contemporary China. Whether the Chinese
will use it or exorcise it will in large part shape the nation's future.
Cl
"See the analysis of this film in The Christian Science Monitor (February 24, 1988).
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Rabbit Season,
Mouse Season
Richard Maxwell
In a 1943 article for The New Republic, Manny Farber said the unsayable. Farber suggested that the
recent work of the
Disney
Studios-Bambi had appeared the
year before-was vastly inferior to
the Merrie Melodies being produced
over on the Warner Brothers lot.
It took thirty years or so for
people to start agreeing, but by the
mid-Seventies Farber's opinion was
widely shared. The new consensus
was defined in Film Comment's special 1975 issue on animation and
the 1980 anthology, The American
Animated Cartoon. Now it's 1988:
even the Disney Studios, if they
want to pay tribute to the art of
animation, have to do it in Warner
Brothers style. Who Framed Roger
Rabbit?, the splendid new Disney
movie mixing cartoon characters
with human actors, is virtue's tribute to vice, Mickey's tribute to
Bugs.
The line between Disney and
Warner Brothers might have been
a bit fuzzy in the early Thirties, but
it soon got clearer. Disney's post-

Richard Maxwell teaches in the Department of English and chairs the Administrative Committee of the Film
Studies program at Valparaiso University.
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Snow White cartoons aspired to
realism, particularly in observation
of motion. The great Warner
animators relied on exaggeration:
think of the kinetic competition between Road Runner and Coyote.
Disney allowed his cartoonists their
gothic indulgences (they were best
handled by Vlad Tytla, responsible
for the wicked queen of Snow
White, Stromboli of Pinocchio, and
several similar characters). Warner
Brothers, on the other hand, remained faithful to a kind of comedy that drew on the resources of
caricature and vaudeville: there was
little or no room for terror, unless
in something like the Fantasia
parody of What's Opera, Doc?; there
was every opportunity for manic
disorientation.
Even the shorter cartoons at Disney tended to be based on elaborate moralistic plots where actions
always had consequences and there
was only one right way of doing
things. Whatever the values of a
Warner Brothers cartoon, they
were
seldom
communicated
through narrative; most often, plot
was replaced by an entropic themewith-variations structure. For example, the notorious "Rabbit SeasonDuck Season-Rabbit Season" joke
could be enacted over and over,
with minute changes; the joke was
always on the point of running
down, but, in the process, its nearrepetition reduced the viewer to
jelly--or rather, to the same kind
of mess that Elmer Fudd made of
Daffy Duck when it was finally established, as it always was, that
Rabbit season had departed and
Duck Season arrived.
Even the colors at Disney tended
to be different from the colors at
Warner Brothers. Disney cartoons
were dressed up in "sweet sugary
tints, flowery violets, fancy-pants
pinks" (Farber's words about Bambi)
moderated-just barely-by careful
draughtsmanship and naturalistic
detail. Warner Brothers used flat

colors rather than glowing ones,
schematic backgrounds rather than
detailed settings, broad lines for its
caricatured protagonists-a choice
only partly attributable to limited
budgets.
Aside from Farber, no critic before the Sixties seems to have had
a good word to say about Warner's.
Tex Avery, Chuck Jones, Frank
Tashlin, Fritz Freleng, and the
other superbly inventive animators
at the studio worked more or less
in a critical vacuum. There was
enough response from audiences to
keep the business going. Leon
Schlesinger, who was putatively in
charge of the Warner's cartoon
line, looked in occasionally to see
what was happening, but he seldom
interfered unless it was to accept a
few Oscars at awards time. (He
kept them too.) Bugs, Daffy, and
the rest managed to become a part
of American folklore at the same
moment when Disney-always the
absolute monarch at his enormous
organization-was reaching, with
much acclaim, for Art. Largely because of Disney's enormous financial and critical success with feature-length animated cartoons, it
seemed for years that Walt had defined a future for the medium,
whereas Warner's had just been
pandering to vulgar tastes.

Walt Disney's post-Snow
White cartoons aspired
to realism, particularly
in observation of
motion. The great
Warner animators relied
instead on exaggeration.
Cartoons became respectable
when they adapted classic tales by
means of lush illustration and powerful narrative, comic interludes
enlivening but not altogether
dominating the whole. This forThe Cresset
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mula worked beautifully; almost
from the start, however, it demanded an outlay of capital which
strained even the resources of Disney Studios. The last full-fledged
essay in the Disney feature-length
cartoon was Sleeping Beauty (1959).
If Disney's great animated features
ended with the Fifties, so, for all
practical purposes, did the Warner
Brothers Merrie Melodies and Looney
Toons shorts no longer in demand.
By the time that the revaluation
of the Seventies began, neither Disney's version of the cartoon nor
Warner Brothers' was a going
proposition; the choice was retrospective, between two extinct alternatives. It seemed hardly likely that
the overdue revaluation of Warner
Brothers could have much effect
on the future of animation; in mass
culture, there wasn't going to be
any future of animation-unless
Ralph Bakshi's half-baked hippie
fantasies or Hanna-Barbera's computerized TV work could be
counted.
Roger Rabbit tries to treat Disney
and Warner Brothers even-handedly, but the movie wears its heart
on its sleeve. Roger begins with an
animated cartoon starring the titlehare and "Baby Herman." Typified
by polka-dotted bow tie, red nose,
enormous feet, and very good intentions, Roger has to watch Baby
carefully or (Mom warns him) he'll
be sent back to the rabbit farm.
Baby, it soon transpires, wants a
cookie on top of the refrigerator;
in an attempt to rescue the kid,
Roger gets locked in the oven,
cooked, skewered (nearly) with
knives, and brained with the
aforementioned refrigerator. The
violent, exaggerated, nonstop action is Warner Brothers style as
seen from the perspective of the
mid-l980s; head animator Richard
Williams is trying to make the ultimate Warner's cartoon-and coming pretty close.
We never get to finish watching
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the cartoon. His head stuck
through the refrigerator, Roger sits
motionless, stunned, with little
(Warner) Tweety Birds chirping
around his skull. At this point the
camera pulls back; we see that
Roger and Baby Herman are live
actors-live cartoons-in a real
studio, being filmed by human
technicians and instructed by a
human director. The director is
hopping mad: the script says that
Roger should have stars circling
round his skull. Because of those
gratuitous Tweety Birds, the take
has been ruined. The movie can
now proceed with its governing
conceit-that, back in the good old
days, cartoon characters literally
had an existence independent of
their
films-but
subliminally,
another, equally important notion
has been planted in our minds:
Warner Brothers made the prototypical cartoons.

If Disney's great
animated features ended
with the 1950s, so for
all practical purposes
did the Warners' Me"ie
Melodies and Looney
Tunes no longer in demand.
We might suppose that this first
sequence is an accident, or that the
choice of Warner Brothers style is
incidental. Later incidents suggest
otherwise. A cover story in Newsweek Qune 27) reports that producer Steven Spielberg acquired
from Warner's the right to use
Bugs Bunny and Daffy Duck. The
studio stipulated that Bugs must be
given equal time with Mickey
Mouse, Daffy with Donald Duck.
Roger's method for holding to this
agreement is instructive. The
Daffy-Donald scene occurs in a
Forties nightclub populated by car-

toon characters ("toons") as well as
by humans.
The celebrated fowl are attempting, unsuccessfully, to collaborate
in an onstage musical routine. The
routine culminates with Donald
spontaneously stuffing Daffy into a
piano, then aggressively slamming
away on it. This is more a Warner
Brothers joke than a Disney one,
but at least both birds are in character (even more than Elmer Fudd,
Daffy became the great fall-guy at
Warner's-and Donald was always
impulsive).
Later the balance tips a little
more. Detective Eddie Valiant (Bob
Hoskins with American accent) visits Toon Town, where he is faced
with the kind of perils to which
cartoon characters are subjected
more often than human. At one
point he falls off a vertiginous cartoon skyscraper, past Mickey and
Bugs, both wearing parachutes.
They discuss his predicament
facetiously. Bugs is believable in
this role, Mickey isn't. The Disney
figure has been Warnerized, transformed from Mr. Nice Guy (his
usual station in life, after a very
early mischievous stage, when Disney was just getting started) to Mr.
Wise Guy.
Roger obeys different physical
laws than we do as well as different
emotional laws: when he discovers
that Jessica has been "playing paddycake" with the mysterious Mr.
Acme, he goes into a perfect cartoon fit-working up to a terrific
shot during which he smashes
through a real window, leaving a
Roger-shaped cartoon outline behind him. These real world-cartoon
world mixtures are jokes with a
point: they follow the Warner
Brothers premise whereby comic
conventions are constantly refined
so that they become more exaggerated, more deliriously logical or
logically delirious.
The Disney tradition, had it prevailed, would have been concerned
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with greater and greater realism,
working towards the impossible
moment when animation could
replicate the effects of live-action
photography. And of course this
film wants to stay away from that
sort of effect: the cartoon characters must remain quite different
from human beings; otherwise the
great special effects lose their
point.

Once you visit the
cartoon world, you are
able to internalize the
craziest of its workings;
sometimes, you can even
fight with a toon on his
own, incredible ground.

The reverse is not necessarily
true: it might be interesting in this
context to watch human beings act
like cartoons. Roger uses a trick of
this sort at its climax, where Eddie
Valiant is compelled to adapt to the
Warner Brothers laws of kinesisand eventually to learn from them.
I've already mentioned a sequence
in which Valiant visits Toon Town.
This wonderful section is followed
by a confrontation between the detective and Judge Doom. Doom is
now possessed of a doomsday
machine which will eliminate all
toons from the earth forever. In
order to prevent him from starting
up this steamroller-like contraption,
Valiant has to act like a toon. He
discovers some ingenious methods
for doing so; almost simultaneously, it is revealed that Doom is a
toon, the same one who killed Hoskins' brother many years before.
Roger's emphasis shifts from the
sheer, comic conventionality of the
toons to the possibility of using that
conventionality, Warner Brothersstyle. Once you visit the cartoon
world, as Valiant has, you are able
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to internalize the craziest of its
workings; sometimes, you can even
fight with a toon on his own, incredible ground.
I have treated Roger Rabbit as a
movie that not only uses cartoons
but is centrally, perhaps obsessively,
about them. This kind of reflexivity
comes as no surprise; American
movtes have been feeding off
themselves for the last twenty
years. Roger does intelligently what
others (Raiders of the Lost Ark and
Star Wars to mention the most famous cases) have attempted without much evident thought though
with ample financial reward.
At the same time, Roger Rabbit
makes gestures in the direction of
specifically political and social
themes. Two examples will suggest
why the film is not altogether successful when considered in this
light. Writing for the Chicago
Tribune, Dave Kehr notes that
"toon" sounds like a familiar racial
epithet, and that the mythology of
toons-boisterous,
violent, sexy
characters who live on the wrong
side of the tracks, living life at its
rawest--can be easily connected to
stereotypes of black American life.
True. Nonetheless, if Spielberg and
company mean us to pursue this
line of thought, then we are more
likely to move towards accepting
racial stereotypes than to achieve a
critical distance from them. The
toons, after all, are intrinsically violent, raw, sexy, etc.-in the words
of Jessica, Roger's curvaceous wife,
they're "drawn that way." Or as
Roger later says, he can do anything, as long as it's funny.
I'm going to assume that the
creators of Roger do not want us to
adopt a similar, deterministic line
on racial minorities; the analogy
with American race relations is
suggestive at times but never the
film's central or controlling device.
Throughout, the toons are what
the movie says they are--cartoon
characters-and their status is

exactly equivalent to the status of
Warner Brothers cartoons (enjoyed
but treated condescendingly) during the cultural period in which
Roger Rabbit is set. The ghetto of
Toon Town is aesthetic.
A second example of the film's
failed attempt to treat wider
themes is its parody-pastiche of
Chinatown. Chinatown, for those who
haven't seen it, is a Seventies imitation film noir with Jack Nicholson as
a disillusioned detective pursuing
Faye Dunaway, John Huston, and
the Los Angeles water supply. The
film develops an analogy between
two different misuses of power:
Huston commits incest with his
daughter (Dunaway) and steals
water to manipulate Southern
Californian real estate values. Each
of these crimes casts light on the
other; each, in its own way, is a
kind of ultimate horror.
Roger Rabbit tries to come up
with a similar plot, based on the
destruction of LA's mass transportation system and its replacement
by freeways. This attempt is not altogether successful: the film has no
feeling for the old trolley system it
supposedly celebrates; imaginatively-in some of its most brilliant
special effects-it is on the side of
the freeways. Moreover, there is no
very obvious connection between
the impending doom of the trolleys
and the threat to the cartoon characters. The script tries to establish
such a link. Toon Town is on the
site of what will become a massive
freeway interchange; the same
character, Judge Doom (Christopher Lloyd), is both the bane of
the toons (annihilating them with a
sort of erasing fluid) and the advocate of the automobile. Nonetheless, these connections remain
forced. They never quite come into
focus.
If, in the end, these missed connections don't much hurt the film,
it's largely because the Warner
Brothers/Disney contrast is worked
The Cresset

out so appositely. According to
Roger Rabbit, it is the possibilities
explored by Warner Brothers
rather than those pursued by the
post-Snow White Disney that define
the vitality of the American animated film . It is Bugs, not Mickey-and certainly not Bambi-who
sets the value of the tradition. On
the whole, I'm willing to accept this
argument (though I may feel differently next month).

I admire the flair with
which Roger Rabbit was
made; it's the product
of an organization only
slightly smaller than
the Pentagon, but it
looks light and easy.

However, even if we are convinced,
we are left with a problem: what
happens to cartoons now? Here
Roger Rabbit equivocates. Hoskins
wins his battle with Doom; then the
doomsday machine goes crashing
through a wall. Perhaps Toon
Town is still endangered. Of
course, we know that cartoons did
decline in popularity and financial
feasibility-just as we know that
freeways did take over Los
Angeles. Roger Rabbit's sunny finale
is thus peculiar, alluding to certain
apparent inevitabilities while refusing to face them.
It could be argued that the
filmmakers pull their punches. All
the same, Roger's conclusion makes
sense in that it matches, even expresses, the equivocal circumstances
under which the film was made.
Perhaps this is the film's political
message. Roger responds, quite brilliantly, to a climate of opinion in
which Warner Brothers seems
superior to Disney . .. but it does
so by Disney means.
The cover story in N ewsweek is tiSeptember, 1988

tied "Who is Roger Rabbit!Spielberg and Disney Take a $45 Million Gamble." The guys at Warner
Brothers never took a $45 Million
Gamble. They goofed around in
the back room and tried to stop
Leon Schlesinger from finding out
exactly what was going on. If they
spent more money than they were
supposed to on one cartoon, they
spent less on the next, then cooked
the books so that it looked like both
cartoons cost the same amount.
(Chuck Jones has detailed some of
these hijinks in interviews; his advice is germane for anyone trying
to survive bureaucratic imperatives
for standardized production.)
I admire the flair with which
Roger Rabbit was made; it's the
product of an organization only
slightly smaller than the Pentagon,*
but it looks light and easy. On the
other hand , the Toon Town admired by this film really has gone
forever. Warner Brothers style can
be brought back, it seems, only by
the combined forces of Steven
Spielberg and Disney Studios, a
team that could probably have gotten the Space Shuttle off the
ground by now. Bohemia, so to
speak, lives-but only if it's supported by a capital investment of
forty-five million dollars.
Wonderful film, Roger Rabbit.
The sequel, we are told, is now in
progress. Chuck Jones, nonetheless,
has retired . Even though Mickey
acts like Bugs, he's still Mickey at
heart.
Cl
*As I write, an item by John
Richardson from the Los Angeles Daily
News has been reprinted in the Chicago Tribune Ouly 23). The Los
Angeles animation unit that worked
on the film is here reported to have
seventy-four members. Collectively,
these people are responsible for the
crucial Toon Town sequence, the
Benny the Car sequence, and "400
feet of additional work." The Los
Angeles unit is miffed because its contribution to Roger Rabbit is listed in the
film's credit under "additional animation ."

Academic Verities
Charles Vandersee
Dear Editor:
I spent $5 just off Harvard
Square last June and got the summer issue of The American Scholar
with your essay about Valparaiso
University-"Athens" and "Jerusalem" in tension, as communities,
respectively, of "inquiry" and "conviction." Like you, I recall those
metaphorical cities in the remarks
of President 0. P. Kretzmann on
frequent public occasions. Each
time, with the wisdom of sophomores, we sat down expecting a
tension between possible elevation
and rather certain banality. Did the
same sonorous truth have to start
every academic year, and maybe
even echo at Christmas vespers?
It occurred to me, reading your
thoughtful
observations
about
Valpo in these last 30 years, that
the relation of students to the
rhetoric of their elders is still one
of skepticism. They do, however,
pay attention to the advice of their
peers. Every year, for example, in
our scholars program I ask for advice to pass on to the new crowd.
Then, in one big advising mailing I
quote a lot of students directly. Future archeologists will discover this

Charles Vandersee has returned to
Dogwood from Schenectady, Cambridge,
Cornish, and various towns, including
Athens-and-]erusalem, in Indiana.
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to be rather cunous m places,
owing to unexpected outcroppings
like food:
"It's best to study in the afternoon, but this makes one hungry
for pizza, and this makes one
thirsty for bubbly beverages."
"Bring a fan and a popcorn popper. My class was told not to bring
the latter because everyone else
would-they didn't. Popcorn is an
essential part of your diet at midnight." "Don't leave food out-bugs
won't exist unless you do." "Be
proud to be from the Midwestand don't shy away from saying
'pop' just because the Southerners
all say 'soda.' "
But as to more abstract matters,
it might be fair to summarize peer
advising as follows:
I. Choose courses by professors, not by subjects.
2. Get involved.
3. Expect to learn more outside
of class than you do in.
These hardly need amplification,
being so characteristically American, so recognizably .rich in displaying the contradiction between the
official purpose of the academy
and what actually transpires. By the
mid-twentieth century, the American university came to exist not really for the mind, but, as Daniel
Boorstin has unflinchingly put it, as
a place for the "worship of the
growing individual." Or, in the candor of one student this year:
"Academic work is quick frozen
and thawed as needed. People are
more important-learn from them
and have fun doing it at the same
time."
A brief amplification of the
above injunctions, based on what
students write down, would run as
follows:
It doesn't matter much what
courses you take in a given semester. Just, if you have any reservation about the teacher on the first
day of a course, get out. It won't
get any better. Second, get involved
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outside of class in something that
interests you, probably something
new, something you didn't do in
high school. It doesn't matter what.
Third, what you'll really remember
and cherish about your college
years are the friends you made (not
the metaphors and truths). The really important thing in college is
learning to get along with other
people, no matter who they are.
So our students sound a bit like
the "mindless relativists" you encounter at Valpo. Still, the relativism turns out to be in service
of certain absolutes. From several
years as an academic dean-which
means I listen, interrogate, and assure people they're sane-I infer
the following dogmas:
I. Intellectual work is by definition solitude and stress, not good.
You have to get away from it, and
this means recreation and projects
done with other people your own
age.

"I'm doing well in my
classes. I have friends.
I'm involved." Long
pause. "But I keep
thinking college ought
to be more than this."
2. The young American mind is
incapable of finding out things by
itself, especially the ways knowledge is
structured and the ways experts decide
what really constitutes knowledge. Professors know secrets about this
stuff, and a good professor makes
these unimportant secrets sound
kind of neat.
3. It's important to keep the
world going around, in pretty
much its accustomed orbit. You do
that not by reading, or thinking, or
meditation, but by learning how to
get along with other people. The
cosmos is give and take.
Now, as I may have mentioned

to you before, as an academic dean
I do one other thing: counsel students in decision-making. The dogmas just listed will sometimes leave
a student unconsciously restless,
unconfident--even subject to despair. The vague sense does arise
among some American students
that college should be more than
these common certainties, that
there is some other knowledge.
The decision to be made is whether
to look further.
Further, that is, than affirming
good human relations, the status
quo, avoidance of margins, distrust
of one's mind. These are a sort of
foursquare academic gospel among
undergraduates in the United
States, and like hard-edged fundamentalism generally, they produce trouble in the soul. As counselor in decision-making, I am
available when (may I quote you?)
"ideologues burdened with unexamined and premature certainties about the world" find deeper
cravings arising. They wish to decide whether these deeper impulses
are to be suppressed or accepted.
Not in so many words, often. It
may be just a plaintive string of
certainties that would delight their
parents: ''I'm doing well in my
classes. I have friends. I'm involved." Long pause. "But I keep
thinking college ought to be more
than this."
This sounds speculative and
melodramatic, but I find it remforced constantly by students and
by fellow members of the university
"support staff." So you will not be
surprised that at the beginning of
another school year I feel moved to
introduce my own certainties.
Though not a physician or a clinical psychologist, or social worker or
pastor, I do wish to sustain life. So
I sustain in private conversation
with students, and sometimes in
groups, a certain small number of
convictions-for
which,
unlike
0. P. Kretzmann, I have not found
The Cresset
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resonant metaphors.
Taking for granted the skepticism of students to most rhetoric
outside of their own generation,
my aim is not to assert convictions
but to find ways of insinuating
them into consciousness. Which is
why I'm glad that my other chief
occupation (as an English teacher)
is the habitual investigation of the
ways language works.
These are the convictions in service of decision-making; please understand me as speaking them to
myself, not to the skeptical ear:
1. There are no secrets; the life
of the academy is not gnostic.
2. Truth is not a gift or an offering but a display; if young
people refuse it, we elders should
not have our feelings hurt, and
should not be surprised.
3. This display is not like a
table full of mayonnaise salads on a
hot day; it won't spoil if you don't
take it right now.
4. No matter how knowledgeable, comfortable, "correct," and
mature various individuals among
us in this academic community may
already be, we are all becoming
new creatures.
5. Like a good parent or a good
candidate for public office, let me
try to be consistent, regardless of
audience.
A few paragraphs to connect
these:
A university is merely an institution, and a small one, even though
some of us, like 0. P. Kretzmann,
can envision it as the nearest
human approximation to the
heavenly city. Since it is a human
institution rather than a force of
nature, its demons can be found
out and usually exorcised. The
highest of its exhilarations can be
attained or at least tasted by all.
The apparently mystifying behavior
of bureaucrats can be understood
and dealt with. The ways of "getting the most" out of college are
well established and not mysterious.
September, 1988

We have codes to break, perhaps,
and folkways to study and codify,
but no secrets. You can figure out
what a particular professor wants
out of you (and why), and you can
petition (often successfully) to
waive a policy that makes no sense.
You can even learn to grasp why
men and women, evidently sane
and mature, will sometimes willingly remain poor in order to live at a
university.
College is not a present or a gift,
with a gift's tiresome obligations. At
age 16, the poet Marianne Moore
"received the present of a bicyclea maroon Reading Standard. Was I
delighted? Not at all. I would have
to Jearn to ride; riding itself was
work." College is a display, of certain truths not self-evident in Ann
Landers or the daily horoscope:
The mind is strong. The status quo
is plaster of Paris. The pleasures to
be gained from life are not always
from peers and from involvement.
But if you don't learn these
truths in first or second year of college, we're not going to suffer a
crisis of confidence. Because we

too, the faculty, as we do our work
(our real work, often distant from
our teaching and our conversation
with undergraduates), ourSelves are
changing, aware that the pace and
kinds of human change can't well
be legislated. We entered the
academy because there we could
forever become new creatures without the endless hassle of inventing
explanations. It is not so easy for
an accountant, let's say, to tell his
firm he plans to spend a month in
Cambridge to read and think and
write.
Finally, it is one measure of credibility in an adviser to remain consistent, and persistent, in these convictions, whether speaking with the
gifted student, the marginal student, the student feeling disenfranchised, the editor of the student paper, the skeptical, the hopeless time-server. Because, as I've
said, students do talk to each other.
But one doesn't always speak one's
convictions quite directly.
Thus the student who has the
grades, the friends, and the involvement need not languish in

Looking North
By late day, the sun leafs gold
The green of Florida. Great oaks glow
Above the fields until the final burn
And darkness. No night is so dark
As summer night here. Not even far north's
Deepest white in winter holds dark
As dark as this. Here the seasons bend
Shadows back little; time ticks
In steady state; and we peer homeWard darkly through the summer's lost
Light, looking for a night we once
Knew bright where our sharp shadows
Rose and fell like steaming breath.

Robert Pawlowski
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mystification when feeling something is missing. But you don't
"give" or "offer" the secret cure.
You suspect he is dutifully writing
papers and taking tests but has not
experienced the passion to find out
things on his own, from the library
stacks or from visits to professorsthat messy but satisfying involvement that the code calls "research"
or "scholarship." Or "love of learning."
One insinuates this into his mind
by displaying instances-the student one knows who was lately
thrilled by an expedition to the Library of Congress; the pair of students who actually took a professor
out to lunch to graze on the insides
of his better-than-popcorn mind;
the visiting lecturer who will tell
you what the Civil War and Reconstruction look like today, which
may or may not coincide with your
five-year-old textbook.
"I would, if I could, let little
things be little things-would be
less susceptible to embarrassment,"
Moore goes on, in her essay, "If I
Were Sixteen Today," lightly
touching the ways our peers and
our folkways hurt us. "Give 'culture' the benefit of the doubt; don't
look on art as effeminate, and
museums as 'the most tiring form
of recreation there is.'"
But, as I've said, you can't say
these things to people. You can't
say to a college student (even if you
attribute it to Marianne Moore,
who actually did say it): "One
should above all, learn to be silent,
to listen; to make possible promptings from on high." You can say
simply, almost at random, as a
carefully planned non sequitur somewhere in the conversation: "A person sometimes likes to walk up
along the Appalachian Trail in fall.
The Blue Ridge is only 25 miles
from here. Would any of your
friends loan you a car?"
From Dogwood, yours faithfully,

c.v .
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On Revising
Class Notes
Albert R. Trost
The more leisurely pace of the
summer allows college instructors
the time to rethink and rework
course notes. Sometimes this means
the excitement of planning a whole
new course or the total redesign of
a course. More often the exercise
involves going over well-known material (and well-worn notes). Hopefully, the product will still seem
fresh to the new generation of students and will be professionally
sound as it comes out in the classroom.
I reached a milestone this summer as I prepared to teach Comparative Politics for the twenty-fifth
year. In this course, four or five
foreign political systems are studied
and compared. The major objectives of the course are to acquaint
students with political systems and
cultures that are different from our
own, and to give the student a
chance to learn about and use the
comparative method of inquiry.
When I began teaching the course
in 1963, almost every textbook included the same four nations, the

Albert R. Trost, a long-time contributor to The Cresset, is Professor
and Chairman of the Department of
Political Science at Valparaiso University.

United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the
Soviet Union.
Over twenty-five years, the texts
and our curricular objectives have
changed in the direction of including nations in the developing world
with non-Western cultural characteristics. The original four nations,
while still very important in today's
world, are simply not representative enough of the 160 or so nations m the United Nations.
Though I still keep up with developments in the four originals,
there is not enough time in a
semester to treat all four of them,
plus some non-Western representatives. I do, though, manage to rotate the four of them into the
course over a cycle of several years.
As I returned to my notes on the
four nations this summer, I reflected on what I (and the texts)
said about them twenty-five years
ago. Were the descriptions and
analyses of a quarter-century ago
still valid today? If I had been in a
coma over that time span, could I
go back and use the same notes?

The more leisurely pace
of the summer allows
college instructors the
time to rethink and
rework course notes.
The answer to the last question
is, of course, no. I could not use
the same notes today that I used
twenty-five years ago or even ten
years ago. All political systems
change continuously, at least to
some extent. The most obvious
change is in personnel, and in
democracies we further expect the
major political parties to alternate
in office. Even in the most stable
and continuous of political systems,
new parties and movements arise
and vie for power.
All this is to be expected. What
The Cresset
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did startle me more than a little bit
in revising my notes was that two
of the four nations have experienced quite profound change over
the last twenty-five years. Those
two nations, the United Kingdom
and the Soviet Union, were precisely the two that in 1963 I would
have confidently predicted would
change little. The United Kingdom
has always been the political
analyst's prime example of stability
and incremental change. When
change comes in the United Kingdom, it is supposed to come slowly
and almost by consensus. The
Soviet Union, for its part, seemed
stifled by bureaucracy and ideological thinking in the early 1960s.
The somewhat fresh breath of air,
the unconventional Nikita Khrushchev, was removed from office by
his Soviet colleagues. Even the benefit of another twenty years of observation of the Soviet system,
roughly the entire tenure of Leonid Brezhnev (until his death in
1982), would only have confirmed
the unlikeliness of the Soviet system to change.
On the other hand, in 1963 I
would have felt the future of
France, then only five years into
the Fifth Republic, to be uncertain.
The uncertainty was compounded
by the unusual leadership of the elderly leader of France, Charles
De Gaulle. Many were predicting
the fall of the Fifth Republic, a regime which had been designed with
De Gaulle very much in mind ,
upon De Gaulle's death or retirement. France's previous regime, the
Fourth Republic, had lasted only
twelve years, and during that time
had seen on average a new government every ten months. France had
changed constitutions or regimes
nine times since the birth of the
American constitution in 1789, and
one could not be too optimistic
about the one adopted in 1958.
Yet it is still around in 1988. It
has survived the retirement and
September, 1988
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death of De Gaulle and much
more. It recently survived a split in
power between Left and Right. It
has survived a President, Mitterand, who had earlier promised
to abolish it. Indeed Mr. Mitterand,
after winning re-election this summer in a convincing manner, actually appeared to give the constitution some credit for his successes.
France has now become something
of a bastion of political stability.
Even the large Communist Party,
which some saw as a threat to stability, is now only half of its former
electoral size and no longer perceived as a danger to the regime's
longevity.

Articles in newspapers
and magazines that talk
about "the Thatcher
revolution" are right
in choosing that label.
West Germany, the last of the
original four, was only fourteen
years old in 1963. It had had only
one leader, Konrad Adenauer. But
an already booming economy and a
strong German aversion to extremism or radical experimentation
in politics led many, myself included, to predict stability and continuity in German political institutions. And so it has been: West
Germany is the only one of the
four nations that has lived up to
my expectations. Only the growth
of the Greens in the 1980s has not
fit earlier analysis and expectations,
and even that surprising political
movement now appears to have
peaked with less than 10 per cent
support among German voters.
The biggest surprise for me has
been Britain, the country I have
followed most closely over the
years. As with the Soviet Union,
Britain has changed significantly
only in the most recent past. The

British change is associated essentially with one political figure,
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.
The articles in newspapers and
magazines that talk about "the
Thatcher revolution" are close to
right in choosing that label. Not
everyone, myself included, would
suggest that the changes are all for
the
good.
Nevertheless,
Mrs.
Thatcher has accomplished at least
four major changes in British politics that were anticipated by almost
no one as late as the election of
1979.
She has radically revised the tax
system in the United Kingdom,
pulling back from taxing the rich at
high rates. She has attacked major
aspects of the welfare state, most
lately the vaunted National Health
Service. She has privatized many of
the previously government-owned
segments of the British economy.
Finally, she has attacked and partially succeeded in diminishing the
power of the trade unions.
Before Thatcher, political observers of Britain commonly said that
while Conservatives in that country
might not be wild about the tax system, the welfare state, nationalized
industries, and the power of trade
unions, they were all part of the essential structure of the British system and would not be repudiated
by any government. They might be
tinkered with or reformed, but
their existence seemed fully accepted by both of the major political parties. Margaret Thatcher has
turned out not to be part of this
presumed consensus.
So far, she has sold off most of
the profitable nationalized industries. She has also used her majority in Parliament to pass laws regulating elections in trade unions so
that votes for leadership and for
strikes might be conducted with
some secrecy and without obvious
intimidation of union rank-and-file.
Mrs. Thatcher is now about to
change the basis of local govern-
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ment financing from property
taxes to a poll tax. In addition, the
highest brackets for income tax will
be lowered and simplified. She has
also introduced competition in the
provision of education by schools
and is about to make the same proposal for health services. And
under her tenure, the number of
owner-occupiers in housing has almost doubled.
Prime Minister Thatcher has
been able to accomplish these
major changes through personal
determination, control of her party
and its majority in Parliament, the
strong constitutional position of a
British prime minister, and-the
one factor which lies outside her
own control-the changing ideological position and electoral decline
of the Labor Party. Next to Mrs.
Thatcher's own appearance on the
scene, this last change has been the
major unforeseen occurrence in
British politics. Through the 1970s
and the tenures of moderate Labor
prime ministers like Harold Wilson
and James Callaghan, political
analysts saw moderation and convergence m the policies and
ideological positions of the Labor
and Conservative parties. The
British seemed destined to maintain healthy two-party competition.
Instead, the triumph of at least a
"Soft Left" position in the Labor
Party has driven many moderates
out of that party to form the Social
Democratic Party. This has split
Labor's vote and is partially responsible for two of Thatcher's three
election victories, those in 1983 and
1987. There is also evidence that
the ordinary Labor voter has found
that party's platform too extreme
and has decided either not to vote
at all, to vote Conservative, or to
vote for the Liberals or the Social
Democrats. In any case, Margaret
Thatcher's appeal and the decline
of Labor's appeal have handed to
the Conservative leader three successive election victories and a ten24
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ure that now totals nine years, the
longest in this century for a prime
minister. Such longevity would help
any leader, and when combined
with Thatcher's will and determination it has made a policy revolution
possible.
The changes in the Soviet Union,
again linked to one leadership figure, Mikhail Gorbachev, have been
much commented on in the West
for the last two years. It is probably
more noticed by the ordinary
American than change in the
United Kingdom. We want to believe that a nation that has been
seen as our major competitor is
changing for the better. Unlike Britain, the changes so far in the
Soviet Union have not matched the
rhetoric. If they do, my notes for
that country will need a major revision.

The changes seen so far
in the Soviet Union do
not mandate a wholesale
revision of class notes,
but they may yet.
Up to the summer of 1988, the
changes in the Soviet Union appeared to be largely at the rhetorical level, or in the personal style of
the General Secretary. We have
had our attention called many
times to that fact that Mr. Gorbachev is relatively young for a Soviet
leader, that he is acquainted with
and admires some Western ideas,
that his wife is attractive, and that
his ideas and style have provoked
some of his "conservative" colleagues on the Politburo. His ideas
are usually focused on three concepts, glasnost, perestroika, and
democratization. It is the last that
we think we understand and
applaud, but which is still largely a
hope or expectation.
Glasnost means openness or

frankness, and there has been a
certain amount of this in the public
media, and apparently in the notyet-public Communist Party meetings. There is much admitting of
past mistakes. In a notable speech
in November of last year, Mr. Gorbachev conceded that not only Stalin had made mistakes, but Mr.
Brezhnev as well. In the Party Conference held this past summer, the
Soviet press reported unprecedented openness and criticism of
the system. Some speakers went so
far as to criticize senior members of
the present Politburo.
P erestroika means restructuring,
and seems to be aimed mainly at
the economic system. One intended
aspect of restructuring involves the
decentralization of decision-making
from the central government ministries down to factory and collective
farm managers. Another proposal
would introduce bidding and competition in the supply of materials
to factories and other production
units. Factory managers are to be
allowed to search for the best deal
in finding the supplies they need.
Finally and most radically, there is
recognition of the validity of small
private enterprises, particularly in
the provision of services to ordinary Soviet citizens. Much of the
perestroika concept was embodied in
the Law of State Enterprises that
was proposed and passed last year.
Demonstrating glasnost, the Soviet
leaders and the Soviet press have
been frank to admit that this law
has not changed behavior as much
as they intended.
The actual changes seen so far in
the Soviet Union do not mandate a
wholesale revision of class notes,
but this revision may yet be necessary. The rhetoric of change remains radical. At the extraordinary
meeting in Moscow this past summer, and in the events and preparations leading up to it, we heard
proposals for reforming political
institutions that are as far-reaching
The Cresset

as those proposed by Lenin or the
early Stalin. They would change
substantially the political system the
Soviet Union has known for the
last twenty-five years. Taken together they would increase democracy within the Communist Party
and would diminish the role of the
Party in the day-to-day direction of
Soviet society and the economy.
Specific proposals include a tenyear limit on the terms of top
Soviet leaders, real choices and
elections at all levels of Party activity, the elimination of the departments within the Secretariat of the
Party that monitor and direct the
economic system, cutting the size
and number of Government ministries involved in running the economic system, and the institution of
a French-style president in the
Soviet constitutional structure. If
these reforms are implemented,
not only will my notes need to be
revised, but it will then be reasonable to expect even further significant change. At this stage, I am
prepared to be shocked out of my
complacency about the Soviet system and its resistance to alteration.
It is the anticipation of change
that brings excitement to the teaching of political science courses,
especially one taught as long as I
have taught Comparative Politics.
At the same time, there is never as
much change as one might like.
Perhaps this long-term continuity
stands as a testimony to the validity
of our earlier analyses of these
political systems and to the aspiration of political science to be a science and to explain and predict the
behavior of political systems.
Yet I did not anticipate the significant changes in the United
Kingdom, nor the prospect of
change in the Soviet Union. This
presents both challenge and excitement enough to carry me-and
maybe the students as wellthrough another year in Comparative Politics.
Cl
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Review Essay

A Proper Knowing
Gail McGrew Eifrig

Flannery O'Connor:
A Proper Scaring
By Jill Baumgaerfner. Wheaton,
II: Harold Shaw. 191 pp. $11.95.
It is by now perhaps a truism to
say that many texts both reveal and
conceal truth from their readers.
Those who know already how to
read the text find truth revealed,
those who don't find the text an
impenetrable jungle. The fiction of
Flannery O'Connor is a striking
example of this phenomenon, and
Professor Jill Baumgaertner's book,
Flannery O'Connor: A Proper Scaring,
is designed to help those people in
the latter category find their way
into the first.
Most people who read a lot of
fiction are comfortable with such a
paradox: they tend to expect that
there is a lot about a given situation
in the text that the text is revealing,
but not saying. Readers, I suppose,
could be divided into two groups:
those who know, accept, and even
enjoy this fact, and those who
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don't. Without trying to be
judgmental, but simply descriptive,
I will refer to these as knowing and
unknowing readers. And before
looking closely at Baumgaertner's
approach to O'Connor, it would be
helpful to examine this knowing/
unknowing quality of reading more
closely.
When Huck Finn, for example,
tells us that he thinks Jim is really
a wonderful person, in spite of his
being a nigger, knowing readers
are aware that the text is not saying
"niggers are inferior." Something
else about the text allows us to
know that what is "really" meant is
that Huck, a somewhat innocent
product of the prejudices of his
times, has correct instincts about
relationships between the races
which run counter to the beliefs of
those he has been taught to regard
as his moral superiors. His youth
prevents him from trusting the
truth of his instincts, and thus he
repeats the words of the prejudices
of the community which is attempting to shape him. Thus the words
of the text tell us one thing, but the
meaning of the text is something
other, and much more complex,
than any particular group of words
might appear to mean.
The problem of what the text
says and what it means has been
particularly difficult, and remarkably public, in the case of Huckleberry Finn, because teachers have
been accused of teaching racist attitudes by having young people
read a book in which a young person expresses racist attitudes. A
great American novel has been
very unjustly criticized, and a great
deal of bad feeling, anger, censorship, and misplaced criticism of
Twain has resulted, principally because unknowing readers have
made a contact with the text, but
do not understand how that text
makes sense.
But of course this distinction
only opens up more problems for
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us as we consider what goes on
when people read. My casual description of two classes of readers,
for example, cannot be taken as defining fixed categories. A person
may be a knowing reader of
Hemingway, and an unknowing
reader of Austen, to pick two writers who may be very surprised to
find themselves in the same sentence. To be a knowing reader requires a combination of knowledge
and detachment, involvement and
disassociation.
To read Huckleberry Finn knowingly one probably must be older
than Huck, for instance, or one
may be unable to see how strongly
his youth, despite his apparent experience and his expressed confidence in himself, hinders him from
seeing truly the nature of his and
Jim's condition. One should know
something about common attitudes
toward slavery in the America
which is the setting of the novel,
and possibly about the economic
and social meanings of the Mississippi River for an emergent
America. But this knowledge and
awareness have to be combined
with the willingness to observe
these characters from the distance
that .such knowledge gives.
We can, to the extent that we are
knowledgeable readers, never absolutely share Huck's world, never
become one with it, never know it
as he knows it, partly because we
recognize the distance between us
as character and reader. But readers who cannot figure out the relationship between themselves and
Huck (and there are a great many
of these, it seems, as readership of
fiction declines), will always be puzzled about how to believe what
Huck says, and how to make sense
of the world he presents and the
truths about that world which his
words both reveal and conceal.
The problems posed by texts for
readers are compounded when the
reputation, or label, of the text
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seems to identify a known quality
which the text itself appears not to
match. Flannery O'Connor, a selfproclaimed Christian writer, frequently puzzles Christians who
read her work. Even knowing readers find themselves baffled about
meanings, for though there is
never any doubt about the actual
events of the narrative in an
O'Connor story, deriving what
many people would recognize as a
"Christian meaning" can be impossible.

Flannery O'Connor
frequently puzzles her
Christian readers.
We are quite certain from the
outset of "A Good Man Is Hard To
Find" that the family is going on a
car trip, and we know all that anybody needs to know about the relationship of family members to
each other. Through the descriptive details we know about the
grandmother's dress, and the children's amusements. Through dialogue we gather something about
the psychology of the relationship
between the son and his wife and
his mother. And we have neatly
presented foreshadowing of the
catastrophic ending in the newspaper and radio announcements of
the wandering killer.
But even after the Misfit has killed
the grandmother, and pronounced
the story's final line-"She would
have been a good woman if it had
been somebody there to shoot her
every day of her life"-most readers are understandably uncertain
how to account for the meaning of
the story, the significance of events.
And to be asked to account for
these significances as "Christian"
not only baffles, but positively angers, many readers.
Baumgaertner's work quite successfully answers the questions

posed by such baffled readers. It
probably even goes far to soothe
the angers of those who feel that
they have been tricked, or bamboozled somehow into reading
something which falsely promised
to be "uplifting." As far as I can
tell, this term identifies what most
people in the world of ordinary
readers mean by the term "Christian" as applied to reading. O'Connor herself has some wonderful
comments on this subject, which
readers of her letters will recall
with pleased, if slightly smug,
smiles.
A Proper Scaring does at least
begin the process of turning unknowing readers into knowing ones
and it does so with thoroughness
and skill. Professor Baumgaertner
is herself knowledgeable, and, as a
teacher, she approaches her audience with the clearly perceived goal
of adding to their information, increasing their understanding, and
providing guidance through a difficult territory. As a volume in a
series designed to provide the general reader with instruction, this
book certainly fulfills all that one
could expect of it. It is a useful
book, shaped to a particular purpose and completing the purpose.
Probably chief among the elements of information given to the
reader is the material on seventeenth-century emblem literature.
It is not really a surprise to find
that this approach to O'Connor is
particularly powerful for Baumgaertner, who is herself a poet and
has written on John Donne as well
as other Christian writers for whom
the emblem offered an immediate
and powerful means of conveying
two meanings at one instant.
Emblems are pictorial symbols,
"pictorial representations of scriptural truth [which] literalized a
motto, epigram, or scriptural passage to provoke a new response to
an old and often too familiar saying."
The Cresset

Though this information is valuable to the person attempting to
become a knowledgeable reader of
O'Connor, since to accept the
premise of this literalized pictorial
representation helps one to understand an essential quality of this
writer's artistic presuppositions, the
reader wishing to know more about
emblem literature as O'Connor
might have experienced it may be
disappointed to find it rather
sparsely described. True, Baumgaertner acknowledges that we
have "no direct evidence that she
was conversant with the tradition."
But if reading for the emblem
quality, or what the author calls
"the emblematic moment," is indeed central to what we are to
learn about O'Connor in this book,
then more information and comment on it as background would be
welcome.
In any case, Baumgaertner takes
her readers on a tour of the
O'Connor territory, wisely arranging the stories according to the
theological emphasis which must be
perceived if the story is to be clear
as revelation. Thus the book opens
with a chapter on Law, making several short comments on early
stories, and concluding with a
thorough discussion of "The Turkey" and "Good Country People."
The next chapter, "Discharged
from the Law," first considers
"Parker's Back" and "The Lame
Shall Enter First," and then concentrates on "The Artificial Nigger."
This method enables the author
to recall to our attention any story
she has previously discussed, building gradually a store of understanding and cross reference that
makes a complicated structure for
the work, but a much more satisfying one than the predictable Early
Stories, Middle Stories, Late Stories
sort of arrangement. In the course
of development of the structure, all
the major stories, and the two
September, 1988

novels, receive attention and some
analysis, though one cannot find
everything that Baumgaertner has
to say about a given story simply by
looking up its major entry in the
index. (The jacket suggests that this
book would be good to use in a
class reading O'Connor, and I
would find that this arrangement
would neatly prevent a student
from simply skimming the critical
work's surface for one or two useful tidbits for class discussion.)
Returning to the book's central
undertaking in the light of the earlier discussion of knowing readership, we must find in this kind of
book an inescapable dilemma. The
critic, scholar, and writer Robert
Fitzgerald, who was one of O'Connor's closest friends, said, in words
she herself used frequently, "It is
the business of the artist to uncover
the strangeness of truth." Those
who find themselves captivated by
O'Connor experience exactly that:
the strangeness of truth.
Even a list of snatches of
dialogue would demonstrate this
quality of her writing, that in a moment, in a phrase, a truth in all its
strangeness leaps out from the
page like a creature with a life of
its own. "As far as I'm concerned,"

she said and glared at him fiercely,
"Christ was just another D. P."
(The Displaced Person) "The law,"
Mr. Shiflet said and spit. "It's the
law that don't satisfy me." (The
Life You Save May Be Your Own)
"Is no man that works as hard as
Chancy, or is as easy with a cow, or
is more of a Christian." (The Displaced Person) "I'm glad I've went
once, but I'll never go back again!"
(The Artificial Nigger) "What's the
matter with you all of a sudden? ...
You just a while ago said you didn't
believe in nothing. I thought you
was some girl!" (Good Country
People)
To put these truths in other
ways, one would have to write
paragraphs of expository prose, describing, for instance that Mrs.
Shortley's conflation of her husband's good hands with a cow and
his status as a Christian is an exact
reproduction of the secular world's
misunderstanding of what Christianity is all about, as though to be
a Christian were something positive
to put on a resume, something
equatable with being an Eagle
Scout, or a Red Cross volunteer,
or, well, a good cow handler. But
as surely as Mrs. Shortley's expostulation can be explained and iden-

Give The Cresset As A Thoughtful Gift
• • The Cresset
Valparaiso University
• • Valparaiso, Indiana 46383

Please send one year (nine issues) of The Cresset at $8.50 per year
to the address below. My check is enclosed.
Please announce the subscription as a gift from:

Name
Street
City _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ State ______ ZIP _ _ _ __

27

--~- - ----

tified, to that extent the strangeness disappears, and the artist's
work is there to do all over again.
At the least, what has been lost
by translating the speaker's words
into the teacher's explanation is the
surprise of the image conveying the
writer's sense of the amazing
strangeness of truth. This loss is
what students complain about when
they insist that the teacher's questions "ruin the poem." I think
teachers, and in this case that includes Professor Baumgaertner,
must always allow that, if their explanations have not ruined the
work, they have at least distorted
or radically changed it in some
way. This danger is especially pronounced when the explainer uses
language that limits or unduly
specifies the quality of the artist's
surprising perception.
For
example,
Baumgaertner
closes her discussion of Manley
Pointer by saying that "one knows
he will take his contradictory, and
yet complementary, messages of sin
and gospel with him on a neverending journey." Now, whatever
one makes of Manley Pointer, and
I tend to agree with most of what
this book makes of him, I think
that such language is too closed off
and specific. It suggests that the
reader can only become knowing
about the text by reading this explanation and accepting it, agreeing
with its conclusions, adopting its
vision. The change to "one suspects" or "one may assume" or
even "I know that" in the sentence
above would make all the difference. Such language would invite
the reader to use the new knowingness which the teacher's premises
have provided, and to move toward
truer readings on that basis, leaving
room for the individual's own response to those surprises and revelations that the original text will
provide.
A similar objection can be made
to the attitude that sees O'Connor
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as an emblem maker only, with the
focus on the intention of the image
rather than on its exterior. This is
the stance of the critic who writes
"The story is really about the encounter of law and gospel." It
seems quite legitimate to say that
"In writing this story, O'Connor
displays an encounter of law and
gospel," or that "This story demands that we consider the encounter of law and gospel." But
"Parker's Back" is really about
Parker, and his tatoos, and Sarah
Ruth Cates. They are not incidental
to a sermon about law and gospel.
And unlike other considerations of
law and gospel, this one, "Parker's
Back," is itself, has its own quiddity, its own view, its own details,
its absolutely unrepeatable form
and design.

As students are quick
to point out, one pays
a price for becoming
a knowing reader.
The unwillingness of the critic to
consider the thing itself as itself
leads in the case of this book to an
impression that the stories are solemn. Though it is true that some
people do not think O'Connor
funny, others do, and the enormously comic quality of both
dialogue and incident gets short
shrift in this consideration.
Which is a pity. Discussing the
foreshadowing of the mother's
stroke present in the first sentence
of "Everything That Rises Must
Converge,"
Baumgaertner first
wants to explain that "her blood
pressure has risen because her
weight has risen," because the concept of "rising" and the meaning
which that term takes in the story is
her immediate concern. But in
focusing there, she seems to miss
the marvels of that comic statement: "Her doctor had told Julian's

mother that she must lose twenty
pounds on account of her blood
pressure, so on Wednesday nights
Julian had to take her downtown
on the bus for a reducing class at
the Y. The reducing class was designed for working girls over fifty,
who weighed from 165 to 200
pounds."
Certainly it is true that you cannot explain to anyone why this is
funny, but somehow the comic in
the statement should not be ignored, especially since it has to do
here with a capacity for self-deception, one of the prime elements of
comedy. Even if the story is characterized by "bleakness," (and here I
do disagree with Professor Baumgaertner) the truth about the quality of this story is that it is often
funny. Some might insist that
whenever God and people collide,
the results are essentially comic;
O'Connor's ear for this quality is
unerring, but Baumgaertner does
not often seem to hear it that way.
Indeed, as students are quick to
point out, one pays a price for becoming a knowing reader. Part of
the price is the loss of a spontaneous response, the rush of emotion
that can make the young, inexperienced reader exclaim, "Oh, I love
this poem!" And another part of
the loss is a sense of humor, and
sometimes a sense of humility before the text. Professor Baumgaertner herself finds an appropriate
balance between knowingness and
humility. One never hears in her
voice the sound of smugness, or of
the patronage that can characterize
someone who attempts to be what
Mr. Head considers himself to be,
"a suitable guide for the young. "
As the author guides her readers
into knowingness through O'Connor's strange byways, she remains
aware of the great mysteries of
grace which are at the heart of this
fiction, dissolving all differences
that separate people from each
other and from God.
Cl
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Tooning In
James Combs
Like many other people in the
scorching summer of 1988, I went
to see the movie Who Framed Roger
Rabbit? Indeed, again like many
others, I went to see it twice. The
first time through, watching the
dazzling interplay of animated and
human action, I had the typical response: how do they do that? The
second time, I could concentrate
more on how well the ambitious interweaving of genres (what director
Robert Zemeckis called "cartoon
noir") worked.
Indeed, the filmmakers seem to
have tried very hard to make a
movie that was simultaneously for
adults and children, and I'm not so
sure they completely succeeded at
that. Little kids in particular might
not understand the adult jokes, but
they can understand the menacing
violence to cute cartoon characters.
Yet I have a feeling that it is adults
who will be made more uncomfortable by the movie than kids.
Throughout the film, the animated characters are referred to as
"toons" and where they live as
"Toon Town." Toons not only
rhymes with an ugly racial slur, but
toons are attributed some of the
behavior patterns that many people
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always want to believe about
minorities-infantile emotionalism,
rampant sexuality, and irresponsible playfulness. A clear social message of Roger Rabbit concerns the
nature of prejudice.
Perhaps Roger Rabbit hits an even
more subtle note. It is adults, after
all, who would be prejudiced
against toons and what they represent. Children, on the other hand,
are very much on the side of the
toons. It is the lure of Peter Pan.
Toons of whatever form represent
for children the anarchic freedom
from social rules and even the constraints of nature that they yearn
for.
Toon Town is a child's idea of
utopia-eternal fun without fear of
actually being hurt, suspension of
the laws of physics, cheerful violence, a ludenic state of pure play.
Further, it is a world where nature
is alive, where animals and even inanimate objects have human childlike (very rarely adult-like) characteristics. If you watch children at
play and overhear the powerful
shared fantasies they conjure up,
you gain some understanding of
the power of cartoons for them. In
the toon world they can all do the
things that here at play we can only
"pretend like."
There is an old theory in anthropology, most identified with the
great
Edward
Tylor,
called
"animism. " Tylor and other early
anthropologists had a bit of a patronizing view of "primitive man,"
believing that tribal myths were essentially "child-like" explanations of
the world that attributed anthropomorphic characteristics to
nature. Trees and lightning and
animals and "spirit beings" all had
some soul guiding or occupying
them. All of nature was alive, and
deserved respect and even worship.
We may snicker at primitive beliefs in soulful animate nature, but
children understand it instinctively.
They believe that the world is en-

chanted, that nature is alive, that
magic works, and they do so in
part because from the earliest age
we adults tell them stories about all
that. We tell them about wonderlands and wizards, talking animals
and trees, witches and trolls, magicians and sorcerers, devils and demons, angels and friendly ghosts,
flying carpets and singing swords,
bewitched princesses and pumpkins
that turn into coaches, little engines
that could and magic slippers that
transport you home.
We tell them about the boogeyman that lurks in the dark to hurt
them if they do something bad,
about the jolly Santa who rewards
them for being good at Christmastime, about tooth fairies and Easter
bunnies, guardian · angels and
haunted woods, gypsies that steal
children, and the little man who
turns out the light in the refrigerator. Clearly children get
familiar with lots of toons.
Not everybody likes it that kids
are told about all those extrahuman
beings. Many of the fairy tales and
suchlike that we tell to children
very likely do have their roots in
"the old religion" that predates
Christianity, and has its eventual
roots in primitive animism. (The
Arthurian legend, after all, has
both Druid priests and witches and
a quest for the Holy Grail.) The
boogeyman probably goes back a
long way in human consciousness,
and that monster from the Id has
likely been used by a thousand generations to control the behavior of
children. The source of a good bit
of the folklore we pass on to our
kids has thoroughly pagan origins.
Indeed, a glance at children's books
and toys produced by contemporary industries reveals that they
have much in common with the
long tradition of fairy tales and
folk figures of yore. (Y oda of Star
Wars is a latter-day combination of
the frog-prince, warrior-mentor,
and Merlin; the disappointing
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..-----------------------------Lucas production Willow is a virtual
compendium of both ancient and
modern toons, everything from
"the little people" of medieval
legend to Tinker Bell.)
Some folks of fundamentalist
persuasion have objected to these
stories, and even to the Christmas
use of Santa Claus. Awhile back
some families in Tennessee objected to the local school board
about the use of The Wizard of Oz in
class, maintaining that the story
contained witchcraft and magic,
and taught children that courage,
intelligence, and compassion (as
exemplified by the Cowardly Lion,
the Straw Man, and the Tin Man)
could be developed by individuals
rather than being simply Godgiven. They also objected to The
Diary of Anne Frank because it
taught sympathy for all religions.
(Since they apparently believe that
only the moral stories o( the Bible
should be taught in public school,
one assumes they would include
the story from the book of Numbers wherein, after a bloody victory, Moses says to the soldiers,
"Have you let the women live? ...
Now therefore kill every male
among the little ones, and kill every
woman who has known man, lying
with him. But all the young girls
who have not known man by lying
with him, keep alive for yourself.")
But it is not just fundamentalists
who try to keep their kids away
from the pernicious influence of
unseemly toons. Parents of various
stripes worry about bad influences
on their kids from popular culture.
Oftentimes they overestimate the
influence of popular culture, and
sometimes they don't understand
the function of popular culture for
kids. Tipper Gore thinks heavy
metal rock music dangerous because it is outrageous and rebellious; the kids like it precisely because it is outrageous and rebellious, an outlet for some, perhaps
most, that they find more amusing
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than compelling. (It might help if
we think of rock singers and
groups as teenage toons.)
But for the movie and TV fare
communicated for smaller kids,
there seems to be a psychiatrist or
parents' group that objects to almost everything. A glance at my
files reveals objections to the Care
Bears, the Smurfs, Sesame Street,
and virtually every program on
Saturday morning TV, even the alltime classic (made ostensibly for
kids but watched faithfully by
adults), the Rocky and Bullwinkle
Show.
·
But I suspect this is nothing new.
I wonder if there were parents'
groups or moral censors of centuries past that took exception to
the fairy tales current in that day?
Did someone point to the horrible
effects on children of reading them
stories about giants who liked to
make bread out of the bones of
Englishmen, or wandering kids
who push witches into ovens, or the
dangers to little girls lured by
wolves?
More recently, just ask Walt Disney. When Snow White and the Seven
Dwarfs first came out in 1937, there
was earnest debate all over the
country about whether children
should see it-the wicked witch, it
was said, was too scary, the magic
too powerful, the threat too great.
(No one, apparently, objected to
the fact that the story involved a
young and beautiful single girl living with seven adult men; the potential sexual inference was handled by making the dwarfs into
toons, and, therefore, not adults.)
Indeed, when Disney classics are
re-released, the same handwringing
occurs. Pinocchio (which, speaking
of animism, transforms a puppet
into a human) punishes youthful
transgression harshly, disfigures
boys for lying, and isolates people
in the cavernous belly of a whale.
The chorus of objections has
arisen most recently with the

re-release of Bambi, perhaps the
most moving, and didactically helpful, of all the Disney animations.
The forest fire, the antler fight,
and most of all, the hunters killing
Bambi's mother-it is all pretty
emotional stuff. (I myself was never
able to shoot a deer after it. Disney's animism, making animals into
cute and very human families,
probably is much disliked by subscribers to Field and Stream. The
scene where Bambi's mother is killed
probably has done more for animal
rights and anti-hunting sentiment
than all the appeals of animal
rights groups.)
Bambi does upset some children,
but I would think the more common response is enrichment. To
deny kids the opportunity of seeing
things like Bambi is to rob them of
one of the joyous experiences of
childhood. The children crying in
the dark at the end have learned
something rather profound about
some important human emotions.
The kids that weren't allowed to attend on the basis of silly adult fears
should have been more careful in
the selection of their parents.
For slightly older pre-teens (9-12
or so), parents also worry about
them seeing horror movies. Kids
that age love them; the bloodier
the better. This is an age group becoming very much aware of
changes in their bodies and of social repression, so they seem drawn
as a group to the horror genre.
(They love to read a fanzine called
Fangora, which celebrates the special-effects artists of the splatter
movies, with gory color pictures of
their artistry-the old ax in the
skull scene is ho-hum stuff to these
aficionados. When you see groups of
these kids enjoying the latest Friday
the 13th movie, you get little sense
that seeing all that gore is going to
turn them all into sociopathic ax
murderers, satanic cultists, or political scientists.
These are kids at the age when
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they pride themselves on telling the
difference between fantasy and reality, and being mature enough to
make it through chainsaw massacres and hauntings and transformations into monsters without getting sick or scared proves it, especially in front of the other guys.
Horror films for them are a scary
amusement, a fascinating exercise
in the technology of fright and
death. They are horrified only by
badly done special effects, and they
make aesthetic judgments on the
basis of how delicious the frights
were. The only kind of film that rivals the horror movie is the war
movie, and they went to see the
Vietnam films in droves. For them
both are better than the stuff that
adults go to see, dumb movies
about a child emperor who sits
around an empty palace for hours
or the boring goings-on among
people in network news or Italian
families.
Parents have a legitimate right to
a say in what their children participate in and consume, but I have a
counter-worry of my own. I worry
that overblown fears about Bambi
and Saturday morning TV and so
forth are symptomatic of a larger
process that some experts see happening now: not letting children be
children and enjoy their childhood.
Think of the horror stories during
the Eighties about highly motivated
Yuppie parents trying to create
"designer babies" who are sent to
spartan pre-school programs, endless rounds of classes (music, language, dance, etc.) before and after
school, summer camps where they
study investment and stockbroking-all preparatory to being enrolled in the freshman class at Harvard in the year 2005.
If kids are made into miniature
adults, and denied the fun and fantasy of childhood, then we will have
robbed them of something truly
precious and unrecoverable. The
combination of national educational
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demands for high degrees of rational skills and productivity and
parental ambitions for their children to be "competitive" might
eliminate more and more of the
discretionary play of childhood at
its best.
Long ago Max Weber wrote
about "the disenchantment of the
world," arguing that modernity was
eliminating the magic and mystery
of life. The scientific attitude, organizational rationality, the expectation of conformist habits-all
these processes eliminate more and
more the "enchanted" aspects of
life. Secularization, for instance,
has made the enchanted claims of
religion more difficult, and indeed
some churches have made liturgical
and theological changes that remove much of the magic and mystery formerly associated with them.
(When was the last time you heard
a defense of the rite of exorcism?)

We shouldn't idealize
childhood as a romantic
world of innocence
subsequently lost,
since it isn't really.
Weber saw this great historical
process as an inevitable result of
modernity, but not necessarily as a
good thing. The disenchantment of
the world is disenchanting to
people who lose faith in an enchanted world. I suspect that religious revivalism stems from this
vague feeling of progressive disenchantment, as does the desire to
read tabloids about UFOs, Bigfoot,
miracle cures, healings, and Elvis
sightings. The power of scientific
rationality has created the organizational and technological world in
which we live, but at the price of
robbing much of the world of settled belief in the enchanted.
Which returns us to the toons.

Childhood should be a time of total
enchantment, as free as possible
from the encroachments of the
adult world kids will have to join all
too quickly. I often observe adults
who watch children at play with
great envy, since they will often remember childhood as the happiest
time of their lives, something now
lost in the mundane world of work
and responsibility.
We don't need to idealize childhood as a romantic world of innocence subsequently lost, since it
isn't really. But we should understand that the toon fantasies of
childhood are more beneficial than
harmful, and let children enjoy
them while they can. For kids,
toons are projections of all sorts of
things, the dramatis personae of their
enchanted world. They talk to the
toons, learn from them, and make
them a part of the treasure trove of
images they will later remember
with fondness. They can then
someday take their kids to see
Bambi, and cry along with them.
How else can you explain why
adults cry at the end of Roger Rabbit? In the last scene, virtually every
toon of our movie memory crowds
in, reminding us of the richness
and joy of an enchanted world that
was, and is, ours. As adults, we can
feel nostalgic about our toon experience as part of a time when we
could unequivocally believe in an
enchanted world.
Perhaps we also have a sense of
loss. Now we can't act like toons,
and are afraid to visit Toon Town.
We have left the enchanted world,
and don't know how to re-enter it.
We live in the noir and not the cartoon. Maybe if we could act more
like toons, and visit Toon Town
more, we would be happier and
freer. But that would mean stepping over some lines, and allowing
ourselves to believe once again in
objects and lands of enchantment.
As Porky Pig said, "That's all,
folks."
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My Friend
Dot Nuechterlein
"I couldn't believe it," my daughter said later, shaking her head.
"There were 1.2 million people and
Mom runs into practically the only
person she knows in Chicago."
On the hottest Sunday of a hot
summer we attended the Taste of
Chicago food festival. We arrived
early to avoid long lines, then found
a shady spot to wait for the evening's scheduled fireworks, watching
the swarming crowds pass by.
It was the largest group I'd ever
been in. We didn't actually lay eyes
on most of them, of course. But we
felt the crowd size at the end, when
hundreds trying to walk north
crossed paths with more hundreds
heading west. As a closet claustrophobe I saw how panic could
develop. Then we all marched
down Michigan Avenue, the "Magnificent Mile," and when a car tried
to drive through, a man's voice
shouted, "Don't anybody get out of
the way." We all laughed-and nobody budged.
But back to my friend . In midday, while "tasting," I saw him,
head and shoulders above most
people. When he and his companion reached us I smiled and said
hello. He didn't recognize· me at
first, with my big floppy sun hat
and those green sunglasses hiding
most of my face-but then he
glanced at my t-shirt and grinned.
What other old lady would advertise the VU basketball team?
He knew my daughters from having sat at our dining table; they exchanged greetings and he introduced his friend to us. We spoke for
a few minutes, then went our separate ways. Our association, once
quite intense, has become a matter
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of pleasant but brief encounters.
One previous meeting was unforgettable . He had invited me to
see him play in the city recreation
league championship, which was
held in a large city park facility,
with maybe 75 people present. I
guess my light hair and pale skin
stood out in the crowd ; everyone
else in the building-the whole
neighborhood, in fact-was black.
Quite often I have been one of a
kind: the only female in the company of males, the lone older person surrounded by students, the
one practicing Christian among
scoffers; but only once before, as a
college
freshman
VISitmg my
Chinese boyfriend in Chinatown,
New York, was I ever the only one
of my race present. It's an experience minorities have regularly, but
U.S. Caucasians seldom encounter.
Since I believe most people are
kind and decent, I felt no fear, but
rather a sort of supersensitivitylike standing back watching myself,
taking nothing for granted.
Perhaps that is the essence of my
relationship with this friend: it is
never matter of fact or assumed.
We are as different as could benot only by race, age, and sex, but
also by religion, education, and
background. Yet for over a year he
openly shared with me his hopes
and fears, dreams and disappointments, while I tried to help him
master the intricacies of surviving
and prospering in my world.
He succeeded in that exchange; I
failed . He came into my life
through academic difficultiesinner city schools had taught him
the fundamentals, but not the more
exacting skills and strategies required in the university. We made
some progress over the months,
but then he fell ill and got too far
behind to be able to continue. He
left, eventually attending another
school; economics prevented his
finishing his degree.
Is there someone you can point

to who has changed your life, who
has had an impact on your perceptions and thinking? He let me see
what it is like to be a black living in
a white world, how it feels to
change from boy to man, how to
absorb new experiences, the weariness bred by poverty. Those insights have helped me immensely
in my understanding of and working with others.
I also learned about the shortcomings of our educational system.
For example, here was someone
with a phenomenal memory who
had never been shown how to use
that gift for school work. Near the
end I noticed his aptitude for
math-why hadn't he ever been
channeled in that direction? He
spoke slowly, haltingly; but when I
handed him a random book and
asked him to read a paragraph
aloud, his voice was strong and
clear, with little stumbling over unfamiliar words; why hadn't that
been discovered earlier?
"People say I'm slow," he once
said bitterly, "they think I'm just a
dumb athlete." On the contrary, I
came to feel that his intellect far
outshone his grade report, but he
had not learned mental discipline. It was as though people had assumed he would make it with his
wonderful physical talents, so why
bother to develop other potentials?
Now we know better, at least at
the college level; or at least I do.
Now the students I advise, especially the athletes , get my full sermon on preparing for the whole of
life. Some can't hear me with the
stars in their eyes, and it's too late
to counteract years of ego-building
and concentration on their dreamlike goal. But I am a bit better prepared to look for their other
strengths and to encourage themnag them-about using them.
Thanks, my friend; you taught
me many valuable lessons, and I
hope we keep running into one
another in the crowd.
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